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Rose H. D. is a Spanish citizen of legal age. Several years ago, she suffered, together with her 
mother, a fatal car accident, when a vehicle driven by another Spanish citizen under the 
influence of alcohol and drugs entered the opposite lane and crashed frontally against their 
automobile. The latter died outright.  
While her mom, Clare D. L., was taken out of the car conscious, awake and only suffered 
from injuries of considerable seriousness but temporary character, Rose had extremely severe 
wounds, including, at a first sight, cuts throughout the whole body, 2nd and 3rd degree 
burnings, broken bones and, according to the emergency physician who tried to save her life 
during the route to the nearest hospital, a “very deep, nasty and worrying injury where the 
neck meets the back”, which had to be surgically intervened upon her arrival. Rose was 
completely unconscious, had to be reanimated several times and had lost an alarming amount 
of blood, which decreased her arterial pressure and left her in a very delicate condition to 
undergo a surgery. The intervention was, against all odds, successful.  
Due to a systemic bacterial infection arising from the surgery, she had to be heavily sedated 
and induced to coma for two months. Once awake, she was diagnosed with a degenerative 
quadriplegia, as a consequence of an irreversible damage to her 7th cervical vertebra. 
Although she could still feel, but not move her arms, she would progressively loose this 
condition to time.  
Antibiotics, pain-killers and blood thinners became part of Rose’s everyday life: she was 
probed, dependant and chained to a bed. The accident crashed her personal, academic and 
professional dreams, being later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress, a major depressive 
disorder and social phobia. Nonetheless, no modification on her mental capacity to reason or 
understand could be found. Throughout the years and within multiple reports of the various 
psychiatrists and psychologists following her, she manifests a clear, unequivocal desire to put 
an end to her life, admitting to have asked her closest relatives to help her die gracefully. This 
desire would materialise in a judicial process in which Rose would seek to avoid any kind of 
criminal responsibility arising from her death, and more specifically, that may be incurred by 
the person assisting her to die.  
Consequently, Rose follows the ordinary path of protection of fundamental rights before the 
administrative courts, stating that not an action, but an omission, and more specifically, the 
absence of a proper regulation regarding active euthanasia in long-term serious illnesses, 
violates the rights contained in articles 10 (regarding dignity and the free development of the 
personality of any individual) and 15 (with special focus on the prohibition of degrading and 
inhuman treatment) of the Spanish Constitution. The pretension is dismissed, arguing that, 
according to the current legal background, it is impossible to grant any kind of active help 
regarding assisted dying, as doing so would go against the actual configuration of the Spanish 
Criminal Code. The Administrative Section of the High Court of Galicia, as well as the 
Administrative Section of the Supreme Court of Spain dismiss the appeal and cassation 
procedure on the same basis.  
The judicial fight arrived to the Spain’s Constitutional Court, which accepted to know about 
the case and examine the potential violation of the articles mentioned above. Before the Court 
could make a decision on the case, Rose found her way to a graceful death with unknown 
assistance. The decease is immediately communicated to the constitutional authority, which 
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also hears the intention of Rose’s mother, Clare D.L., to represent her daughter in the 
proceedings, according with the provisions contained in the departed’s will. Furthermore, 
Clare argued that her “locus standi” was not only determined by her daughter’s desire, but by 
several civil law provisions which placed her as heir in regards to rights and obligations. The 
Constitutional Court dismissed the procedural succession and archived the diligences 
regarding the case, considering that such rights were intrinsically linked to human personality 
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The social and legal debate arising from the question “how someone is supposed to die”, and 
more importantly, “how to die gracefully” did unquestionably have an exponential 
development over the last decades. However, human interrogatives on death are not modern-
time progresses: Socrates 1 , Plato and Aristotle already wondered about death and its 
transcendence within life back in 4th and the 5th centuries B.C., although such questions, as 
some tend to assure, are inherent to human nature. Ancient Greece is, without a glimpse of a 
doubt, the birthplace of the cornerstone of this thesis: euthanasia, and a modest etymological 
analysis will help the reader to understand the formation of quite an “avant-garde” conception 
with thousands of years of history. 
 
Euthanasia (in ancient Greek, εὐθανασία) is formed by the prefix-morpheme “Eu” (εὐ), literally 
meaning well or easy, and thanatos (θἀνατος), meaning death. It is generally accepted among 
linguists that the word arose as a literal transcription from Roman times fulfilling the necessity 
of describing a behaviour, attitude or action that, even when already existing as a social reality, 
was not named in specific terms2. Its use became widespread in texts of the Latin era3, although 
the Catholic Church’s adamant condemn to suicide4 would ostracize the idea from the social 
and political scenario for centuries. Thomas More, but more prominently, Francis Bacon, 
would contribute to the actual conception of euthanasia as, generally speaking, “the/an action 
of the physician over the patient, including the possibility of anticipating death5”. Despite a 
significant development, specially relevant in medical and scientific areas, until the end of the 
XIX century and the dawning of the XX, the term became closely related to the eugenic ideas 
of Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche, which would be later recycled by the German National-
Socialist Regime with the aim of justifying racial selection, together with the extermination of 
those who were considered “unfitting”. This bonding impeded, for a considerable amount of 
time, to bring euthanasia back on the table. 
 
Fortunately, this ill-fated tie with the horrors of the WWII was lost to time, and as society 
moved towards never-seen levels of freedom and development, the question over the self-
disposition of life rose from its ashes. Brittany Mennard, Nathan Verhelst, Dianne Pretty, 
Debbie Purdy or Ramón Sampedro are the best example of the overrunning of such period. It 
is not merely about the particular circumstances of each case, nor their academic, legal, or 
political significance: their mere existence, the social and popular acknowledgement of their 
presence already enshrines the start of a new age in which the topic will be addressed in a 
completely different manner. In this context, further characterised by the more-than-
remarkable scientific progress and innovation in all fields related to human sciences, the 
modern consideration of euthanasia is born.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the introductory part of this essay will strictly focus on the legal 
definition, consideration and problematic of euthanasia in relation to the questions proposed 
 
1 Plato describes, in his famous “Phaedo” or “On the Soul”, the pacific, calm and resigned behaviour with which 
Socrates deals with his own death. For some, this description constitutes the synthesis of the classical concept of 
euthanasia, as understood back in that time.  
2 Gaius Suetonius describes Emperor Augustus’ death in very similar terms to that of Socrates, but mentioning, 
for the first time in history, the word “euthanasia”. 
3 Seneca the Younger, Marcus Aurelius and some other relevant Roman figures mention the word in texts of 
significant transcendence. 
4 Or any practice involving the deliberate killing of a person, understanding life and death as God’s exclusive 
power. 
5  Bacon, F., “The Advancement of Learning”, 1605. 
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by the Case Study, although the issues, concerns and dilemmas that this topic evokes should 
always be treated as multidisciplinary and quite difficult to limit. The consideration of such 
topics is key to understand the legal transcendence, complexity and peculiarity of Rose’s case, 
considering the popular claim asking for a change in assisted dying legislation in recent years. 
Such a change would allow many people, including Rose, to take over their own life and decide 
how to end it.  
 
Euthanasia is, roughly speaking, the deliberate causation of death of a suffering patient for 
humanitarian reasons. There is a clear core definition which cannot be taken away without 
blurring the very essence of the procedure (allocated in the above-mentioned formulation), but 
determining the scope of the definition requires to establish a set of properties to which the 
legal world has no ultimate response: who should be considered a suffering patient? Who can 
cause that graceful death without incurring in responsibility? Can someone with an interest in 
the patient’s death assure a humanitarian purpose of the action? The limitation of the topic is 
decisive for its successful operation, bearing in mind that a conception too broad could make 
abusive situations occur, while a restrictive one could leave some patients in need out of the 
process. The situation is such that the World Health Organisation (hereafter, WHO) itself has 
no straight definition of the procedure, although it mentions it in several documents6. Due to 
their long-standing cooperation7, it seems like, whenever referring to euthanasia, the WHO 
firstly adopted the definition established in the 39th Assembly of the World Medical 
Association8, now completely rewritten in the “World Medical Association’s (hereafter, WMA) 
Declaration on Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide9”, stating that: 
 
“Euthanasia is defined as a physician deliberately administering a lethal substance or carrying out an 
intervention to cause the death of a patient with decision-making capacity at the patient’s own voluntary 
request”. 
 
Furthermore, the WMA makes a necessary remark when defining assisted suicide, which is 
sometimes inappropriately used as a synonym of euthanasia:  
 
“(physician-) assisted suicide refers to cases in which a physician enables a patient to end his or her 
own life by prescribing medical substances to bring about death”. 
 
There is, nevertheless, another crucial concept, that even when not being included in the 
WMA’s declaration, is socially accepted within the debate as a synonym of euthanasia. No 
academic or doctrinal discussion would, however, dare to make such an inaccurate balance. 
“Assisted dying” is quite a broad conception which refers to any help which is given to a person 
in the process to die. This aid does not have to include any kind of direct or indirect causation 
of death: palliative care, psychological assistance or mere companion can be considered to fall 
 
6 Technical Report nº804, regarding Pain Relief and Palliative Care in Cancer (8th April 1993, available in 
https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/39524 ) was the starting point of a list of documents mentioning euthanasia, 
either to recommend it or not. Cancer was the first illness to which euthanasia was linked, although the latest 
documents tend to have a more general scope and extend their recommendations to other areas. Suicide Prevention 
documents sometimes mention euthanasia, as in “Preventing Suicide, a Resource for General Physicians” (2000, 
available in https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/67165 ), although the reference is so vague that it only 
enshrines the moral difficulty to assess and implement euthanasia and assisted dying in some jurisdictions.  
7 The WHO and the World Medical Association have a well-established relationship of cooperation and mutual 
help in certain scientific fields. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is the best example 
of that hand-in-hand aggregate effort. 
8 WMA Declaration on Euthanasia, Madrid, Spain, October 1987 (not in force).  
9 WMA Declaration on Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 70th General Assembly, Tbilisi, Georgia, 
October 2020. Available in https://www.wma.net/policies-post/declaration-on-euthanasia-and-physician-
assisted-suicide/  
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within the scope of assisted dying, as enshrined by numerous documents published by WHO10. 
Even so, both the WHO and the WMA fail to provide with a specific classification of the 
different types of dying processes included under the scope of euthanasia. The most attractive 
classification within the legal sphere focuses on the relevant conduct by the third party causing 
the death in penal law terms, or in other words, the euthanasic conduct in relation to the person 
who is exercising it, in the following manner: 
 
1. Passive Euthanasia is used to refer to a conduct in which, either by an action or an omission, the relevant 
person in charge of the life-sustaining treatments prolonging the life (or the agony) of the patient stops 
making or decides not to make use of those, letting nature follow its path without any procedure 
addressed to perpetuate life11. 
 
2. Active Euthanasia implies the causation of death up to some extent. The foreseeability of death, together 
with the casual link which is established between the action of the third party and the consequence itself 
determines the following classification:  
 
a. Active, direct euthanasia, traceable as the most widespread conception of the word, consists of 
the administration, prescription, supervision or execution of any conduct directed to cause the 
petitioner’s death, knowing that the action, whatever it is, will undoubtedly lead to a decease.  
b. Active, indirect euthanasia refers to a behaviour intended to reduce the state of pain and 
suffering of the patient, sedating the latter, knowing that, even when not causing death directly, 
such measures will shorten and affect the person’s life expectancy. Commonly known as 
“palliative care”, these procedures improve the quality of life of the patient, but reduce its 
extension. 
 
3. Genuine Euthanasia: substantially created by Professor Romeo Casabona to describe any measure 
intended to achieve the objective of a “well-lived death”. In his own words “genuine euthanasia must 
constitute an assistance to die, not a measure intended to cause death itself”, coining a formulation 
similar to that of “assisted dying”, but of a more limited influence12. 
 
Accordingly, euthanasia is not only a complicated matter from the moral perspective, its mere 
formulation already generates polemic in the different disciplines which are affected by it. In 
the national scope, the situation was not so different: Law 41/200213 does not exclusively deal 
with dying procedures, but also with some transcendental provisions regarding medical consent, 
as well as the creation of a legal instrument, the “advance directive documents14”, thought to 
allow the patient to decide on certain matters in case of arriving to a situation in which he/she 
is not able to validly consent under the requirements of Law 41/2002 and Law 14/198615. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of the Autonomous Communities16 have passed laws regarding 
the regulation of palliative care and assisted dying in their respective territories17, following 
 
10 While this Organisation is quite reluctant to mention euthanasia in its documents, it has a vast, well-developed 
repository of sources regarding palliative care for terminally ill or suffering patients, including children. WHO, 
“Integrating Palliative Care and Symptom Relief into Paediatrics”, 2018. Available in 
https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/274561  
11 The traditional deontological duty within Medicine was considered to be the preservation of life. Nevertheless, 
more and more authors assure that the importance of life has been greatly replaced by the concept of quality of 
life, understanding death as a moment within life in which is necessary to guarantee certain minimum standards 
in order to avoid needless pain and suffering to the patient. 
12 It is unclear if palliative care should be included within Casabona’s conception of genuine euthanasia, bearing 
in mind that the application of sedative or lenient procedures is scientifically proven to reduce the patient’s life 
expectancy, and therefore, the predictability of death is out of question. 
13 Law 41/2002 of the 14th November, Basic Regulatory of the Autonomy of the Patient and Rights and Duties in 
regards to Information and Clinical Documentation. ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2002/11/14/41/con  
14 Section 11, ibid. 13.  
15 Law 14/1986 of the 25th April, General of Health.  ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/1986/04/25/14/con 
16 With the exceptions of Ceuta, Melilla, Castilla La Mancha, Extremadura, la Rioja and Aragón.  
17 Cantabria does not have a law itself, but a Programme to implement Palliative Care.  
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the National Plan for Palliative Care18 that established a minimum threshold from which each 
region developed its own strategy19. More recently, Organic Law 3/202120 turned Spain into 
the 5th country around the globe to expressly regulate euthanasia and physician-assisted dying. 
Although not yet in force, as it is expected to become binding by the 25th of June of this very 
same year, it already implies a victory to all those associations that have fought over the last 
decades to regulate it in our country21, in the name of thousands of patients that had to draw on 
exile, clandestinity or illegality as to achieve a comprehensible aim that is, as it will be 
explained, undoubtedly within the limits of the national and international legal framework.  
 
Stating that euthanasia makes the traditional configuration of subjective human rights shake 
from its ground might sounds slightly drastic. Notwithstanding, no other legal, ethical and 
social dilemma has made so many rights clash against each other. Living in a State under the 
rule of Law, as stated in art. 1(1) of the Spanish Constitution, and therefore bound to respect 
certain inherent human rights, might lead some to think that, in accordance with that provision, 
the right to life, crystallised in art. 15 of the same legal text, should always be preserved above 
all the other rights. In fact, the Spanish Constitutional Court has pointed out this general duty 
of the State to preserve and promote the right to life in a vast number of cases, in which 
Judgements 120/199022 and 137/199023 are worthy of mention. However, thinking that any of 
the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution is unlimited would be a mistake, as 
previously stated by the same Court in its Judgements 11/198124 and 2/198225. Therefore, it is 
impossible to assure that the right to life, as settled down in the Spanish Constitution, is an 
absolute, unlimited grant: if it was, there would be no debate regarding euthanasia. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter, UDHR) also recognizes the right to life in 
its article 3, but in a different way: while in the national scope it is accepted that life is the 
necessary basis for other rights to arise, the argumentation that is made within the UDHR for 
the existence of such rights is not life, but human dignity. It is impossible to prevent any jurist’s 
mind from trying to establish a certain inner  hierarchy. Yet, the question might not be to choose 
 
18 Approved by Plenum of the Interterritorial Congress of the National Healthcare System, celebrated the 18th 
December 2000. Available in 
https://www.mscbs.gob.es/organizacion/sns/planCalidadSNS/pdf/excelencia/cuidadospaliativos-
diabetes/CUIDADOS_PALIATIVOS/opsc_est7.pdf.pdf . The text was enacted following Recommendation 1418 
fof the Council of Europe (25th June 1999), for the Protection of the Human Rights and Dignity of the Terminally 
Ill and the Dying. Available in  http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/xref/xref-xml2html-
en.asp?fileid=16722&lang=en  
19 In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Law 5/2015 of the 26th of June, regarding Rights and Guarantees of 
the Dignity of the Terminally Ill, of the Autonomous Community of Galicia,  which will be applicable to the case. 
ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2015/04/27/5/con  
20  Organic Law 3/2021 of the 24th March, on the Regulation of Euthanasia, ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2021/04/12/3  
21 Association “Derecho a Morir Dignamente”, in a very similar way to that of its famous analogues “Dignitas”, 
in Switzerland and Germany, and “Dignity in Dying” in the UK, pushed the whole legal system and its operators 
to legalise such processes and respect the patient’s desire to find a peaceful death.  
22  Judgement 120/1990 of the 27th June, Constitutional Court of Spain, Amparo Appeal nº. 443/1990, 
ECLI:ES:TC:1990:120. 
23  Judgement 137/1990 of the 19th July, Constitutional Court of Spain, Amparo Appeal nº. 397/1990, 
ECLI:ES:TC:1990:137. 
24 Judgement 11/1981 of the 8th April, Constitutional Court of Spain, Unconstitutionality Appeal 192/1980, 
ECLI:ES:TC:1981:11. 
25  Judgement 2/1982, of the 29th February, Constitutional Court of Spain, Amparo Appeal nº 41/1981, 
ECLI:ES:TC:1982:2. 
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one over the other26, but to shift the main focus of attention depending on society’s needs in 
different times and spaces. 
 
The present essay, for the purpose of deeply examinining, solving and thoroughly answering 
the questions proposed by the selected Case Study, will additionally deal with the following 
matters: 
 
1. The relevance, legal consideration and potential outcomes of euthanasia as a social and legal reality in 
the national and international scope. 
2. The transcendence of a person’s decision or consent to die, with special mention to the advanced 
directive documents of Law 41/2002 and their operation in euthanasic circumstances.  
3. Comparative solutions proposed by other jurisdictions to the “well-dying” problem. 
4. The influence of the factors explained above in Rose’s life, death,  judicial journey and, ultimately, the 




































26 The term “human dignity” did not appear in the original writing of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
it was adopted by Protocol 13 (2002) as to justify the abolition of death penalty. 
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1. Characterise from the criminal law point of view the facts committed by the Spanish 
citizen which led to the accident. Determine the arising penal and/or civil 
responsibility, indicating the competent Court to hear and solve the case, as well as 
the subsequent punishment.  
 
For the purpose of solving the conundrums which are included within this question, the present 
section has been divided into 4 subsections in accordance with the subject matter which is being 
treated therein.  
 
1.1. Bodily Harm as a Criminal Offence in the Spanish Penal Code.  
The expression “bodily harm” (in Spanish, “lesiones”) serves as headline of Title III of Book 
II of the Spanish Penal Code27. It enshrins not only the importance, which is given to the 
protected value underneath this group of offences, but also the frequency with which crimes of 
such nature are perpetrated. According to National Institute of Statistics (hereafter, INE), 
injuries were the third most frequent type of illegal behaviours committed during 2019 (69.437 
reported offences 28 ), right after crimes against wealth and the socioeconomic order (the 
undisputable winner, with 141.686 offences) and crimes against collective security (103.257). 
It is clear that the importance which has been progressively given by human societies to 
integrity, both in its physical and psychological way, together with the assiduousness with 
which this value is harmed, diminished or disregarded29, has also encouraged the legislator to 
make major changes during the not-so-long life of our Penal Code. The ostracism of 
misdemeanours (very minor offences) implemented by Organic Law 1/201530 , together with 
the rigid regime established in between serious and minor injuries 31 , left some negligent 
behaviours scot-free depending on the seriousness of the infraction of the duty of care32. Thus, 
victims of reckless conducts saw their demands dismissed in the criminal way due to the mild 
character of the imprudent behaviour itself, regardless the seriousness of the unlawful result. 
The deflection of such pretensions to the civil way in the vast majority of cases33 did not offer 
an appropriate legal response, and therefore, Organic Law 2/201934 was issued as an attempt 
 
27  Organic Law 10/1995 of the 23rd November, of the Penal Code (hereinafter, PC). ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/1995/11/23/10/con  
28 Chart and data available in https://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Datos.htm?t=25997#!tabs-grafico  
29 Throughout the past six years, the number of reported offences related to injuries has experienced a significant 
rise, doubling its value in certain cases (only 33.767 crimes were reported back in 2013). As some authors indicate, 
this sustained expansion might not be due to an empirical increase of those behaviors, but to a greater rate of 
complaint when facing such situations.  
30 Organic Law 1/2015 of the 30th of March, by which Organic Law 10/1995 of the 23rd of November, of the Penal 
Code, is modified. ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/2015/03/30/1  
31 Point XXXI of the Preamble of Organic Law 1/2015 does not only eliminate injuries as a fault, but also 
establishes a categorical difference in between “serious injuries”, crystallised in arts. 147.1, 148, 149 and 150 of 
the Penal Code, and “minor injuries”, enshrined in arts. 147.2 and 3 of the same document.  
32 J.M. Menéndez, C. Nicolás, “Harder Punishment for Imprudence”, Journal of the General Directorate of 
Traffic (DGT), 2nd April 2019, available in: https://revista.dgt.es/es/reportajes/2019/04ABRIL/0402Reforma-
Codigo-Penal-mas-dureza-imprudencias.shtml  
33 Ibid 32.  
34 Organic Law 2/2019 of the 1st March, modifying Organic Law 10/1995 of the 23rd November, of the Penal 
Code, regarding imprudence in driving motor vehicles and scooters and sanction for abandonment the accident 
site.  
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to palliate the undesired negative effects35 of OL. 1/2015. By extension, several provisions of 
the Penal Code were modified as to ponder imprudences that, either because of the lack of 
transcendence of the behaviour or the legal irrelevance of the breach of due diligence, were not 
criminally considered before. All of these factors will play a significant role within the legal 
characterisation of Rose’s case. Once this more than necessary basis has been laid down, it is 
time to examine in more depth the legal concept of bodily harm, its regulation within the 
Spanish Penal Code and its potential application to the case. 
 
The core definition of bodily harm36, as a pure criminal term, appears in art. 147(1) of the Penal 
Code, establishing a minimum definition from which other types of injuries, and more 
specifically, aggravated and privileged kinds of woundings, will be built around. Consequently, 
the criminal definition of injuries within the Spanish legal framework falls within the words 
written hereafter:  
 
“Whoever, by any means or procedure, causes another an injury that detracts from his bodily integrity 
or his physical and mental health, shall be convicted of the offence of grievous bodily harm, with a 
sentence of imprisonment of three months to three years, or fine of six to twelve months, whenever the 
injury objectively requires medical or surgical treatment for health purposes, in addition to qualified 
first aid. Simple qualified surveillance or monitoring shall not be deemed medical treatment”37. 
 
However, this definition leaves quite some room for interpretation as to what should be 
considered an “injury” falling under the scope of the article. The vast jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court on this matter has fortunately provided with a set of empirical examples that 
further specifies the strictly legal definition, stating that:  
 
“the concept of injury must be appreciated whenever there is a harm to the bodily substance, a disruption 
on the normal functioning of the body, a modification on the shape or appearance of some of its parts, 
as well as the incitement of physical ailments of a certain entity, such as fear or disgust, that affect the 
central nervous system”38.  
 
Therefore, and despite the pure physical nature of the name of the offence (commonly 
associated to direct, corporal violations of the victim’s substantial integrity),  a bodily harm 
will also include mental and psychological detriments, as well as other types of behaviours that, 
even when not directly exercised over the sufferer, have a physical manifestation on the body 
of the victim. The non-consented administration of toxic or psychotropic substances or the 
psychological debasement39 arising from a violent situation are the best examples to illustrate 
the historical and judicial development of the offence, that has clearly grown in a way that 
 
35 Organic Law 1/2015 was addressed to comply with the legislative “minor intervention” principle. SCJ of the 
13th June 2000 (ECLI:ES:TS:2000:8451) already indicated, in its 2º ground and even before the adoption of the 
reform, that such principle was addressed to the legislator, not to the judge, and therefore, the non-intervention 
principle should not be used as an instrument to justify nor challenge any kind of judicial determination. Although 
it might be influenced by it, “the principles of legality and in dubio pro libertare will guide the judge’s decision 
and, within the limits of the law, he shall decide”. 
36 The official English translation of the Spanish Penal Code, provided by the General Technical Secretariat of the 
Ministry of Justice in 2013, uses the terms “bodily harm” and “injuries” indistinctly, as pure synonyms, and so 
will the present thesis. Available in: 
https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/6443/file/Spain_CC_am2013_en.pdf  
37 Some parts of the translation have been adapted to comply with the wording in force of the article, after the 
modifications implemented by OL 1/2015.  
38 This rationale was upheld by the same Court in its Judgements 376/2003, of the 10th March, and 1400/2005, of 
the 23rd November. 
39 The High Court has even appreciated psychological harm as independent, autonomous offences with its own 
differing sustantivity from the principal crime being heard, in cases such as Judgement 167/2012 of the 1st March, 
ECLI:ES:TS.2012:1796. 
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outstrips the traditional enlightened conception in which bodily harm was vested40. In fact, this 
tendency to a more generic approach of harm has encouraged legal operators to interpret the 
conception of injury as protecting individuals even from the aesthetic consequences deriving 
from violent occurrences. Regretfully, this progressive phenomenon also presents its own 
drawbacks: the enlargement of the criminal figure to behaviours alienated from the physical 
sphere complicates the establishment of the causal link between the action, the actor and the 
result, which is needed to allocate responsibility under the standards of the theory of objective 
imputation, and for that reason, determining guilt can become (even) harder in such situations. 
Being aware of this issue, both legislator and jurisprudence have made a comprehensible 
attempt as to establish a close set of sine qua non requirements that must be present ito 
appreciate bodily harm:  
 
- The presence of a harm, impairment, detriment or deterioration on the victim, imputable to the actor, 
even without the concurrence of physical power.  
- Qualified first aid: encompassing the acts of diagnosis, soothing measures and healing procedures that 
require minimum sanitary intervention, with or without the need of additional monitoring. This kind of 
assistance is addressed to obtain an initial treatment promoting a fast rectification of a “prima facie” 
non-serious harm: the cleaning of an open wound or the prescription of pain-killers fall into this 
spectrum.  
- Medical or surgical treatment: going beyond the scope of qualified first aid, it refers to a more exhaustive 
arranging of a healing formula that might include, although not necessarily, a surgical intervention. The 
use of steri-stripes or analogous adhesive procedures41 might well be the most illustrative example of 
such treatments, characterised by their longer endurance in time42 and empirical equivalence to certain 
interventions (e.g. stitching). As for surgical interventions themselves, Judgement 732/2014 of the 
Supreme Court43 does not hesitate to state that such procedures, no matter major or minor, do not include 
the diagnosis, preparation, exploration and recovery of the patient, which would then fall within the 
section mentioned above. In a similar direction, Judgement 58/201544 of the same Court delves into the 
radical difference between such treatments and medical surveillance that, as pointed out before, falls 
mainly under the scope of qualified first aid. Regardless whether surgical or medical treatment are 
needed, the main issue that will trigger any Court’s acquiescence to acknowledge the existence of such 
treatments, and by extension, the recognisement of a bodily harm, is the objective need of the treatment 
itself as to accomplish the healing of the injury. In this regard, Judgement 546/201445 of the Supreme 
Court constitutes the absolute cornerstone, when proclaiming that:  
 
“the necessity of a medical treatment or intervention which is referred to by art. 147, to be 
summed up to qualitative first aid, must respond to grounds deriving from the nature and the 
characteristics of the harm itself in relation to the criteria that the medical science considers 
applicable in analogous cases. If using those criteria, medical and/or surgical treatments are 
considered to be necessary after qualified first aid, a bodily harm offence must be recognised 
(…) with independence of what has happened in the case being heard, as the aggrieved might 
have preferred to attempt healing without such interventions, or even attending other 
individuals which are not professionally qualified for offering such assistance. (…) Leaving the 
observation of bodily harm to the factual existence of medical or surgical treatment would be 
 
40 E. Echeburúa, “How to Ponder Psychological Harm and Emotional Aftermaths in Victims of Violent Offences”, 
Clinic, Legal and Forensic Psychopathology (2005), Vol. 5, p. 60. Available in: 
https://www.masterforense.com/pdf/2005/2005art3.pdf  
41 Intended to accelerate the healing procedure. There is a whole jurisprudential line of the Supreme Court 
emphasazing the nearly surgical character of adhesive, approximative and closing procedures that do not require 
surgical intervention, starting with Judgement 1441/1999 of the 18th October, and maintained throughout 
Judgement 1481/2001 and, more recently, Judgement 519/2016 of the 15th June, ECLI:ES:TS:2016:2898. 
42 Immobilization with plasters or slings is also generally considered to be medical treatment due to the clear 
endurance of the procedure in pursuit of a fast and succesful healing, being such procedures objectively required 
in light of the nature of the harm, as enshrined in Judgements 1392/1997 of the 19th November and 432/1999 of 
the 22nd March of the Supreme Court of Spain.  
43 Judgement 732/2014 of the 5th November, Supreme Court of Spain, ECLI:ES:TS:2014:4453. 
44 Judgement 58/2015 of the 10th  February, Supreme Court of Spain, ECLI: ES:TS:2015:418 
45 Judgement  4083/2014 of the 9th July, Supreme Court of Spain, ECLI:ES:TS:2014:4083. 
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giving the victim the power to choose whether the challenged behaviour is an offence or a 
misdemeanour”46. 
 
It might appear redundant to repeat something that has already been brilliantly exposed in the 
decision above, but its practical transcendence will justify some further digging into the 
question. As the quote points out, the medical treatment or intervention must be objectively 
required, extending its effects in a double sense. Firstly, it is not enough for the appreciation of 
bodily harm to go to a physician and seek treatment, nor it is acceptable to persuade a 
professional to perform such actions over the injury in order to proclaim bodily harm. Secondly, 
it is absolutely irrelevant if, as the case may be, the victim decided to obviate the treatment, to 
choose another or simply attended other professionals not specifically qualified in the health 
sphere. The objective character of the treatment makes any subjective feature of the factual 
reality irrelevant, as those cares or procedures that have taken place must rely on what’s diligent, 
foreseeable and reasonable according to the long-standing tradition and deontological rules by 
which Medicine and its professionals are governed47. Accordingly, whenever a jurist wonders 
if a certain medical behavior should fall into this scope, he will search, at an early stage, for 
the intervention which is foreseeable according to the applicable deontological rules and, if any 
doubt still arises, the use of precedents and the ponderation of analogous situations will light 
up the way. The level of objectivity which has been implemented is such that, as surprising as 
it may seem, it is absolutely irrelevant whether the physicians, nurses and practitioners who 
gave the victim the qualified first aid are the same ones who actually perform the prescribed 
treatment and/or surgery: as all of them are ruled by the same set of deontological principles, 
the law understands that, leaving personal differences apart, a diligent action should always go 
in the same or a similar direction.  
 
Withal, real life tends to push, challenge and tighten the theory, and as it could not be other 
way, all the requirements described above still propose pragmatical complexities. For that very 
reason, the legislator, within the deep criminal reform inherent to OL 1/2015, decided to turn 
the old bodily harm misdemeanours into privileged types of injuries, criminally justifying a 
lower punishment in the lack of fulfilment of some of the requisites48 of the basic type of art. 
147(1)49. This slight tip of the balance towards the criminal regulation of any activity involving 
bodily harm enshrines the protectionist character of the law in regards to the preservation of 
physical and moral integrity50 or, as some authors consider more appropriate to this day, the 
general wellbeing of any individual. As a matter of fact, it is difficult (and up to critique) to 
assure that the objective conception of the bodily harm offence responds strictly to that of a 
result crime, taking into account that, even if with a lesser penalty, conducts which are prone 
to cause injuries are punished under subsection 3 of art. 147. This provision does not require 
an specific harm or result for the crime to be appreciated. 
 
 
46 The Judgement was passed before the reform of OL 1/2015, and therefore, still allows for the difference between 
the basic offence of bodily harm and the misdemeanour. 
47 The Deontological Code, published by the General Council of Official Colleges of Doctors in 2011, contains 
the basic regulations regarding medical ethics which are applicable to/by (and expected from) any qualified 
professional. Available in: https://www.cgcom.es/sites/default/files/codigo_deontologia_medica.pdf  
48 Article 147.2 of Organic Law 1/1995, of the Penal Code. 
49 Judgement 463/2014 of the 28th May, Supreme Court of Spain, ECLI:ES:TS:2014:2264, is the best illustration 
of quite a common situation: a behaviour causing an injury, needing qualified first aid but without complying with 
the requirements of medical or surgical treatment, and therefore, punishable under subsection 2 (privileged 
offence), but not subsection 1 (basic offence). 
50 Undoubtedly derived from the constitutional mandate of art. 15 of the Spanish Constitution. 
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Even so, in relation to the present case study, we should mention that, in consideration of the 
seriousness of the facts and its consequences, privileged offences can be of very little help in 
Rose’s situation. In contrast with those more benevolently punished crimes, arts. 149 and 150 
embody the aggravated kinds of woundings erected over the basic type of art. 147(1). Despite 
the existence of a native-derivative link in between the different types of injuries and the basic 
kind, it is clear that, as it was underscored within the paragraph dedicated to privileged types, 
the mere existence of a classification enshrines the existence of some critical differences that 
will make such qualification possible. The presence of qualified first aid followed by medical 
or surgical treatment continues to be the bedrock to appreciate bodily harm. Even so, 
aggravated types, as it will be explained hereafter, are characterised by the concurrence of a 
more specific or serious result. The injuries appreciated under arts. 149 and 150 are clearly 
defined and provided for legally, as being considered the most harmful and unlawful versions 
of the offence. Formally divided in very serious (art. 149) and serious (art. 150), both of the 
provisions describe, in quite a medical jargon, a series of alterations, malfunctions, deformities 
or damages to the corporal and/or psychic substance of the victim, being the result of flagrant 
violations of the most fundamental rules of cohabitation in society. Hence, they should be 
proportionally punished in accordance with the criminal disapproval of the conduct, weighing 
up the severity of the outcome.  
 
Art. 149 of the Spanish Penal Code will be, without a glimpse of a doubt, the most significant 
provision in order to characterise Rose´s legal position after the accident. It is entirely and 
exclusively dedicated to extremely serious injuries, some of which can even anticipate death 
or significantly deteriorate quality of life, state of mind and personal independence. The article 
is further divided into two subsections. Only the first section, of a more extensive coverage, 
will be analysed in the present essay. The second provision, referring to genital mutilation, was 
introduced by OL 11/200351, and although presenting its own undeniable relevance, it will not 
transcend in Rose’s case. Without further ado, art. 149(1) recites the following:  
 
“Whoever causes to another person, by any means or procedure, to forfeit or lose the use of a major organ 
or limb, or a sense, or sexual impotence, sterility, serious deformity or to suffer a serious physical or mental 
illness, shall be punished with a sentence of imprisonment from six to twelve years”. 
 
Thus, the literal wording of the article encompasses , to say the least, 4 different groups of 
extremely severe injuries which have been treated and developed by jurisprudence in a separate 
way among them, despite some of them being bound together for academic and professional 
reasons:  
 
- Forfeit or lose of the use of a major organ, limb, or sense: the conduct which is being penalized here 
includes the amputation or absolute disablement of major organs, limbs or senses, or in other words, the 
irreversible loss of the inherent functional capacity which is attributable to the affected region. The 
consideration of “major” has been greatly debated and still continues to put judges in a delicate situation: 
the lose of an arm, hand, tongue, the auricular pavilion, nose and even the hymen has been already 
considered as extremely serious bodily harms. Nevertheless, the existence of adversarial judgements on 
certain body parts52, further complicate the uniform application of law in this area. The position of the 
High Court in regards to the lose of a sense is worthy of mention: while some functional deprivations 
are subsumed by the major consideration of the organs which exercise such sensorial roles (as it is the 
 
51 Organic Law 11/2003 of the 29th September, of specific measures regarding citizen security, domestic violence 
and social integration of foreigners, introduced the second section of art. 149, being aware that (female) genital 
mutilation still remained (and remains) to be a cultural and religious tradition for some people, despite constituting 
a legally unjustifiable violation of a person’s corporal substance. ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/2003/09/29/11  
52 The spleen has been considered both as principal and non principal organ in different Judgements, with no clear 
explanation to argument such distinction. 
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case with sight and hearing), the Court has been quite reluctant to acknowledge other types of sensory 
losses53. 
- Sexual impotence or sterility: firstly, sexual impotence refers to the incapacity to perform the sexual act, 
regardless the sex. When referring to sterility, both law and jurisprudence understand that it entails the 
complete deprivation of the capacity to procreate naturally, without mediating assisted-reproduction 
procedures or treatments.  
- Serious deformity: constitutes the area of greatest judicial development of the article. At an early stage, 
serious deformity was considered in regards to the relation of the victim with others, and the 
transcendence that the harm could have in such involvement. This initial position is corroborated in the 
earliest legal definition of deformity, understanding it includes:  
 
“All kinds of physical irregularities of a visible and permanent nature that entail the defacement 
or ostensible hideousness to the plain eye, as well as those that include a corporal modification 
from which negative social and convivial effects can be derived” 
 
Therefore, deformity will be appreciated whenever the entity and seriousness of the result exceed such 
definition, as stated by Judgement 396/200254 of the High Court. Nowadays, the Court has moved to a 
more “state-of-the-arts” understanding of deformity, which shifts the main focus of attention of the 
traditional term, allocated in the social and relational effects of the harm, to the consequences and 
personal transcendence that the disfigurement has for the victim itself, taking into account the 
consideration that the aggrieved has over his/her own body. 
- Serious physical or mental illness: judicial operators understand that the seriousness of both psychic of 
physic ailments must be assessed according to the risk, the duration and potential reversibility55, the 
inherent limitations which are derived from it and the severity of the treatment which is objectively 
needed.  
 
In the author’s view, the presence of a harm to Rose’s bodily substance is undeniable. In fact, 
the exhaustive character of art. 149 in regards to extremely serious injuries is not sufficient to 
encompass the irreversible harm which was caused to her. In line with the entity and the 
seriousness of the injuries, it is not considered appropriate to analyse art. 150 of the Spanish 
Penal Code, which refers to the lose or forfeit of a non major limb, organ or sense. Tetraplegia 
is an irreversible condition that affects not only one, but a plurality of organs, limbs and senses, 
all of which should and actually are considered major in relation to the absolute lose of their 
inherent functionality. First qualified assistance was not only necessary, but performed “in 
situ” due to the jeopardy of Rose’s state. Both medical and surgical treatment were also needed. 
Indeed, the several reanimations which were required to keep our protagonist alive on the way 
to the hospital could be classified as medical treatment, as no human would dare to doubt the 
objective necessity of such procedures to comply with the traditional deontological duty of 
Medicine: the preservation of life. The same rationale should be applied to the surgery which 
was executed upon her arrival, as if not for the procedure, Rose would be undoubtedly dead.  
 
There is, nonetheless, one subjective element of indisputable transcendence that has not been 
analysed yet: the culpability of the actor. Until now, all the relevant provisions which have 
been described refer and punish active, desired and intentional behaviors, featuring a clear 
foreseeability of the result and the unconditional harmful desire of the perpetrator. These 
circumstances are, however, not met in Rose’s case. In strict criminal theory, a person’s guilt 
 
53 In Judgement 80/2015 of the 6th February, Supreme Court of Spain, ECLI:ES:TS:2015:543, regarding the 
complete lose of touch in the hands, the Court only appreciated the forfeit as serious because of the victim’s 
blindness condition, understanding that the sense of touch was further developed and necessary to be able to act 
independently. 
54 Judgement 396/2002 of the 1st March, Supreme Court of Spain, “aftermaths should have enough quantitative 
and/or qualitative entity to significantly modify pejoratively the victim’s appearance”. 
55 Judgement 242/2013 of the 1st April, Supreme Court of Spain, ECLI:ES:TS:2013:1575, embodies the Court’s 
position regarding the possibility or actual revocation of the illness, stating that the chronification of the condition 
is a highly relevant factor to appreciate the seriousness of the harm.  
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must be regarded from different perspectives depending on the concurrence of the following 
subjective elements:  
 
- Intellectual element, which refers to the capacity of the author to understand the outcomes of his 
behaviour or the values which are at stake when consciously deciding to disregard legality.  
- Volitive element, pertaining to the actual desire of the offender to cause the unlawful result. 
 
It does not transcend if the causative agent of the accident had the mental capacity to understand 
the consequences of the intake of toxic substances and its effects on driving. It is also not 
specified whether he had a valid driving license or was controlling a vehicle of his own. 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the offender did have the capacity of 
understanding the potential implications of his behaviour, as the act of driving already requires 
a certain level of intellectual awareness, eradicating the possibility of arguing any kind of lack 
of capacity or understanding. Accordingly, the existence of a valid license and the ownership 
of the car will only constitute satellite elements which will be part of a bigger scheme, in which 
the focal point will be straightly fixed in the harm being caused. Furthermore, it is also logical 
to understand that, while considering the intake of drugs, the author could have had 
contemplated the existence of a potential risk and even acknowledge the unlawful character of 
his conduct56. Even so, it becomes harder to assert whether, under the influence of such drugs, 
he could be aware of the violation of the duty of care which is inherent to any person driving a 
vehicle in such circumstances. Whatever the case may be, there is one certain fact to which this 
thesis should cling: it is unthinkable to believe that the author desired the final outcome or 
contemplated it as a possible result of his behavior, taking into account that such attitude led to 
his decease. Hence, the crime being analysed lacks the clear intentional character which is 
needed to appreciate arts. 147(1), 149 or 150.  
 
It will be necessary to jump back to the very first pages of the Spanish Penal Code in order to 
throw some light over the culpability of the actor. Art. 5 of the Spanish Penal Code 57 , 
commonly used to enshrine the inexistence of a penalty without intention or negligence, 
consecrates one of the maximum epitomes of the application of the principle of legality into 
criminal law. In this particular instance, the legal recognisement of two types of authorship 
opens the door to the regulation of offences which are not desired or intended by the 
perpetrator. Article 10 of the same legal text58 moves towards the same direction. Accordingly, 
together with the regulation of intentional offences, the Spanish Penal Code also regulates the 
negligent version of certain types of offences 59 . Generally speaking, imprudences are 
academically considered to be crimes of result, and therefore, the mere performance of an 
imprudent behaviour will not give rise to penal liability: to appreciate negligence, it must be 
concreted in the disapproved, unlawful result which is attached to the description contained in 
the Code and, on the flip side, this result must be the unequivocal outcome of the negligent 
conduct being challenged.  
 
Last, but not least, it is necessary to mention, even if briefly, the possibility of considering 
Rose´s depression as an independent offence under the 4th element of art. 149(1) of the Spanish 
 
56 Constituting a voluntary “actio libera in causa”, and consequently ostracising the possibility of arguing the 
inimputability of the subject.  
57 “There is no penalty without intention or negligence”. 
58 “Offences are intended or negligent actions or omissions punished by law”, another introduction of the legality 
principle into the most remarkable regulatory document of criminal law in Spain.  
59 Not all the crimes punished in the Penal Code include a prevision condemning the imprudent type. It is critical 
to mention that all those imprudences which are not expressly regulated within the Code are exempt of criminal 
responsibility.  
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Penal Code, dedicated to serious mental or physical illnesses. The first thing to note down here 
is the medical consideration of depression as a severe medical disorder, acknowledged by 
WHO as the most relevant cause of disability around the globe60. National authorities are also 
aware of the issue, with public documents such as the National Health Survey of Spain of 2017 
61 revealing an affection rate that should settle the topic in the center of all measures regarding 
the future development of the National Healthcare System. The already mentioned 4th 
component is expected to protect both physical and psychological illnesses in the same way. 
Nonetheless, the key matter for any Court to include depression within the scope of this 
provision of the Spanish Penal Code trascends the mere recognisement of depression as a 
severe disorder: Against this background, in the author’s view / we considerat that Rose should 
be able to prove the separate, self-standing and autonomous entity of such result in regards to 
the physical injuries, and due to the progressive development of the mental affection and the 
undeniable link existing between those two, such craving is very likely to be dismissed.  
 
1.1.1. Serious Imprudent Injuries of art. 152(1) in light of art. 379 of the Spanish Penal 
Code. 
Art. 152, entirely dedicated to the negligent version of bodily harm, is formally divided into 
two subsections. This substantial division is legally motivated by the same rationale which is 
generally followed to determine the seriousness of any reckless behavior: the infraction of the 
duty of care62. The conception of duty of care is closely related to that of the classical standards 
of diligence or prudence which have been extensively use in law since Roman times. In fact, 
the idea of duty of care does not differ enormously from the archetypes which are used within 
the Civil Code (hereafter, CC)63 to serve as a guide of conduct, namely: articles referring to the 
administration of the goods of others commonly appeal to the fiduciary duty of “acting as a 
reasonable, good, prudent or diligent family man64” when making everything on a person’s 
hand to avoid the production of a harm. Coming back to criminal law, it turns out that the legal 
rationale behind the idea of duty of care is not that different: firstly, there is a code of conduct, 
an expected behavior, a proper attitude which is objectively required and arises from the 
existence of a duty owed, in this case, to society as a whole. This reasonable behavior is 
expected from anyone accepting the risk of performing certain mundane activities that, despite 
their day-to-day character, have a great potential to cause harm. Driving is, hands down, one 
of those conducts. Whenever performing such actions, a risk is created, but law tends to work 
under a fiction in which the concept of duty of care should, at least in theory, eliminate the risk 
and facilitate the administration of justice65. Withal, if someone decides to breach that expected 
 
60 WHO, “Depression”, Fact Sheets, updated the 30th January 2020, available in: https://www.who.int/news-
room/fact-sheets/detail/depression 
61  Abbreviated ENSE in Spanish, available in: 
https://www.mscbs.gob.es/estadEstudios/estadisticas/encuestaNacional/encuestaNac2017/SALUD_MENTAL.p
df  
62 J.Pérez Tirado, “The reform of the Penal Code by OL 2/2019 regarding imprudence in driving motor vehicles 
and scooters and sanction for abandonment the accident site: a social movement claiming for Justice”, Traffic 
Law, LEFEBVRE, available in: https://elderecho.com/la-reforma-del-codigo-penal-por-lo-2-2019-en-materia-
de-imprudencia-en-la-conduccion-de-vehiculos-a-motor-o-ciclomotor-y-sancion-del-abandono-del-lugar-del-
accidente-un-movimiento-social-en-busca-de  
63  Royal Decree of the 24th July 1889, by which the Civil Code is published, ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rd/1889/07/24/(1)/con  
64 Article 1903 of the CC, in its very last paragraph, clearly indicates that “the responsability that is dealt with in 
this article will cease to be whenever the persons mentioned above are able to prove that they used all the diligence 
of a good family man to prevent the production of the harm”. 
65 This fiction is thought to facilitate the comprehension of a very complex legal rational to the average citizen, 
which can be simplified to “If you make everything that is expected or required (being diligent, prudent, careful) 
from you, you won’t incur in criminal liability”. 
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conduct and provokes an unlawful result protected under criminal law, he falls outside the 
protection which is given by the standards of diligence and, therefore, must be liable for that 
breach. Accordingly, assessing the seriousness of any negligence encompasses the 
consideration of the foreseeability of the potential risk which has been created by the violation 
and its inherent lack of diligence, in relation to the specific duty of care that was owed by the 
perpetrator66. This argumentation is upheld by Judgement 335/1982 67of the Supreme Court of 
Spain, describing the signature features of any negligent action or omission. 
 
Serious, imprudent bodily harms follow that scheme as to allocate criminal responsibility 
whenever the offender, following a conduct which goes against such standards, specifies the 
behavior in the perpetration of the unlawful result being protected by the penal provision in 
question. On this occasion, the result which is being punished under art. 152 of the Penal Code 
is the undesired causation of bodily harms. As mentioned earlier, the article is divided in two 
sections depending on the seriousness of the negligence68, and for reasons which will be 
discovered hereafter, the present thesis will only focus on part 1 of the article. 
 
Article 152(1) of the Spanish Penal Code states the following:  
 
“Whoever causes any of the injuries foreseen in the preceding articles due to serious negligence shall 
be punished:  
1. With a sentence of imprisonment from three to six months or a fine from six to eighteen months, 
in the case of the injuries described in article 147(1). 
2. With a sentence of imprisonment of one to three years, in the case of the injuries described in 
article 149. 
3. With a sentence of imprisonment of six months to two years, in the case of the injuries described 
in article 150. 
When the acts referred to in this article have been committed using a motor vehicle or scooter, the 
punishment of deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles and mopeds for a term of one to four years 
shall also be imposed. For the purpose of the present article, driving in concurrence of any of the 
circumstances provided for in article 379 will determine the serious nature of the negligence, as long as 
such concurrence had determined the the production of the result”.  
 
And on its part, art. 379 recites:  
 
“1. Whoever drives a motor vehicle or a moped at a speed that exceeds the speed permitted by law by 
sixty kilometres per hour in urban streets, or by eighty kilometres per hour on non-urban roads, shall be 
punished with a sentence of imprisonment from three to six months, or with that of a fine from six to 
twelve months, or with that of community service from thirty one to ninety days and, in all cases, with 
that of deprivation of the right to drive motor vehicles and mopeds for a term exceeding one and up to 
four years.  
2. The same penalties shall be applied to whoever drives a motor vehicle or moped under the influence 
of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances or alcoholic beverages. In all cases, whoever drives 
 
66 Judgement 211/2007 of the 15th March, Supreme Court of Spain settles this seriousness test, despite being 
already being in use for quite a long time. 
67 Judgement 335/1982 of the 13rd March, Supreme Court of Spain, stating the integrating elements of negligence 
that must be distinguished:  
- An unintentional human action or omission.  
- An objective duty of care, bearing in mind “that distraction and/or mere neglect themselves constitute 
the core element of guilt within the imprudent type and affect its components (…) as the subject should 
have had foreseen the consequences of his conduct”. 
- The harm of a third party’s legal interest.  
- A causality link in between the voluntary action or omission and the harmful result. 
68 Serious Negligence (art. 152.1) or less serious negligence (art. 152.2). A bodily harm resulting from a minor 
negligence will not be criminally considered.  
Alexia Díaz Cerceda. 
- 21 - 
 
with a rate of alcohol in expired aire exceeding 0.60 miligram per litre, or a rate of alcohol in the blood 
exceeding 1.2 grams per litre, shall be sentenced to those penalties”. 
 
The pragmatical consequences for the present analysis are crystal clear: the person causing the 
accident should be accused of an offence of serious, negligent bodily harm of art. 152(1) of the 
Penal Code, arising from Rose’s injuries, which must be framed within the result described in 
art. 149, regarding very serious injuries. Section 2 of art. 152 is completely irrelevant to the 
case as the concurrence of the circumstances of art. 379 (driving under the influence of  both 
alcohol and drugs) of the same document force the consideration of both harmful results, that 
of Rose and that of her mom, as serious negligences. Clare’s injuries will be imputable to the 
offender in case they comply with art. 147(1): objectively requiring qualified first aid and 
medical or surgical treatment. If any of those two requirements is not met, Clare’s injuries’ will 
be scot-free, as woundings contemplated in art. 147(2) (without the need of medical or surgical 
treatment) are not punishable in their imprudent version.  
 
As bitter as it may be, the legal reality prior to OL 2/2019, although not altering Rose’s legal 
standing69 , would substantially change Clare’s. With the adoption of OL 1/2015 and the 
decriminalisation of imprudent misdemeanours, some imprudences, even when constituting 
serious or very serious administrative infractions under arts. 76 and 77 of Legislative Decree 
6/201570, were not appreciated to be of enough entity as to standardise the administrative 
qualification to its criminal consideration. Consequently, serious injuries committed while 
performing an administratively severe infraction were judicially characterised as less severe or 
minor offences, and therefore left unpunished. The situation was so critical that, already 
obviating the popular movement of multiple associations of victims asking for a reform of an 
unquestionable mistake, the Annual Report of the Public Prosecution’s Office enshrined the 
bleeding and unstable condition of the operation of law regarding road safety when expressing 
that:  
 
“it is alarming to see how the Investigative Courts dismiss pretensions (…) even when there 
are solid grounds that point out a serious negligence, such as in collisions with pedestrians, 
without proceeding to a minimum investigation bringing some light as to the pure legal severity 
of the negligence being heard”71. 
 
To lay all cards on the table, it must be said that OL 1/2015 was promoted and upheld by the 
Public Prosecution’s Office, as understanding that it was necessary to move minor offences of 
irrelevant criminal transcendence to other fields of law in order to accomplish a more efficient 
functioning of the penal courts. Nevertheless, the pragmatical inapplicability of less severe, 
imprudent injuries of art. 152(2), together with a general malpractice on the criminal 
consideration of negligences that, even without constituting an outraging breach of the duty of 
care, had catastrophic results for the victim in question, condemned this unfortunate attempt of 
reform to exile. These facts will even become ironic to the the reader when realising that some 
of the provisions of OL 1/2015 directly contravened the Office’s position, as stated in some of 
its circulars72. 
 
69 Serious, imprudent bodily harms were already punished by the original wording of OL 10/1995 of the 23rd 
November, of the Penal Code.  
70 Implementing the consolidated version of the Law on Traffic, Circulation of Motor Vehicles and Road Safety 
71 Annual Report of the Public Prosecution’s Office of 2017, Chapter III, Point V, Road Safety. Available in: 
https://www.fiscal.es/memorias/memoria2017/FISCALIA_SITE/capitulo_III/cap_III_5.html  
72 Circular 2/2011 of the 17th November, on criteria for uniform, specialised performance of the Prosecution 
Service on Road Safety, FIS-C-2011-00010 , contained provisions which actually supported the creation and 
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1.2. Civil consideration of the facts. 
The obligation to repair a harm derived from the commission of a criminal offence is not “alien” 
to the Spanish Penal Code: it dedicates the integrity of Title V to the explanation of the potential 
civil responsibility that may arise from the commission of a wrongful conduct. Article 109 
subsection 1 formally proclaims, for the first time within the document, the obligation to 
ammend any damage which is considered inherent to the performance of an offence73. This 
responsibility will be further determined as restitution, reparation or compensation 74  in 
accordance with arts. 111 ff. However, no mention is made in relation to the guilt of the 
offender. Quite surprisingly, article 1902 of the Civil Code75 refers to the possibility of an 
unintentional action or omission giving rise to civil responsibility, paving the way to a potential 
claim for damages against an offender that did not desire nor behold the final outcome of his 
reckless conduct. In a more suitable way to the case being analysed, art. 382 of the Penal Code 
refers to the express punishment of any arising civil liability when committing an offence under 
the circumstances which are provided for in arts. 379, 380 and 381. In virtue of everything that 
has been exposed, it is evident that the perpetrator of the accident leading to Rose’s condition 
will undoubtedly have to respond for the harms and injuries which were caused by his 
negligence while driving under the concurring circumstances of art. 379. 
 
The key question here, as the Regulation of the Compulsory Civil Responsibility Insurance in 
the Circulation of Motor Vehicles76 indicates, will be the consideration of the collision as a 
“traffic event” under the legal and jurisprudential requirements 77 . On this consideration 
depends the use of all the instruments which have been enacted by the legislator to protect 
traffic victims, which include a very specific, objective and legally levied formula to calculate 
the potential compensation that can be claimed in concept of damages according to the physical 
or psychological harm which is imputable to the catastrophic event. 
 
Back in the academic field, “traffic event” has been traditionally defined as an “eventual 
incident produced while driving in which some subjects of circulation interact in a way that 
causes death or injuries to people or damages to objects”78. Article 100 of Law 50/1980, of 
the Insurance Contract79 deals with a very similar definition when stating that “it is understood 
as accident any bodily harm deriving from a violent, unexpected and external cause which is 
 
effective application of the less severe kind of negligent bodily harms, and promoted the punishment of those 
imprudences that had serious negative results for the victim. The only support which is given to the disappearance 
of the old misdemeanours, of a strict procedural and theoretical nature, lies on the lack of criminal transcendence 
of either the behavior or the result of some of those minor offences, and as stated by the Prosecution Service at a 
later stage, “no action having considerable negative results as a consequence of a criminally projected behaviour 
should be left unpunished”. 
73 Article 109.1 of the Penal Code: “The execution of an action described by law as an offence forces to 
compensate or restitute the subsequent harms and damages in the terms provided by law”. 
74 Article 110 of the Penal Code establishes the three possible ways to compensate the harm. 
75 “Whoever, by action or omission, harms another, mediating guilt or negligence, will be compelled to repair the 
harm”. 
76  Royal Decree 1507/2008 of the 12th September, approving the Regulation of the Compulsory Civil 
Responsibility Insurance in the Circulation of Vehicles, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rd/2008/09/12/1507  
77  Judgement 556/2015 of the 19th November, Supreme Court of Spain, quoting the Judgement of the 4th 
September of 2014 of the Court of Justice of the EU, understands that “any normal and expectable use of the 
vehicle should be considered to fall within the concept of traffic event, even when there is no physical movement 
involved”. Available in: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=157341&doclang=ES  
78 J.S. Baker, L. B. Frickr, “Traffic accidents investigation manual”, 1986, Ed. Northwestern University Traffic 
Institute, implemented in 1970 by the Directorate General of Traffic (DGT). 
79 Law 50/1980 of the 8th October, of the Insurance Contract, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/1980/10/08/50/con  
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unrelated to the intentionality of the policyholder, producing a temporal or permanent 
incapacity or even death”. From the combination of both of the definitions, subsequent laws 
have elaborated a “numerus clausus” set of requirements which must be appreciated to consider 
a random event of the circulation as an accident:  
 
- The material element of the accident, which must be allocated to a subject encompassed within the 
definition of vehicle which is given under Annex I of Royal Legislative Decree 339/199080: “any device 
which is able to circulate on the ways and fields described by art. 2 section 1 of Royal Decree 1507/2008” 
- The space element of the accident, framed in the definition of art. 2 section 1 of Royal Decree 1507/2008: 
“(…) including garages or parkings, public and private ways which are suitable for circulation, urban 
and non-urban, as well as those that, without being enabled as such, are commonly used by the public”. 
This definition is considered to be quite broad, as it includes any road with the exception of those to 
which the access is factually impossible81 
 
Once the foreclosures of art. 2 subsection 2 of the Regulation82 have been examined, and 
bearing in mind the express reference which is made in art. 2 subsection 3 of the same text, 
assuring that “the use of a motor vehicle in any of the other ways described by the Penal Code 
as offences against road safety, including the premise of art. 382, will be held as traffic events”, 
there is no room for doubts: Rose should and will be able to claim damages in accordance with 
the predetermined legal framework which will be explained hereafter.  
 
RLD 8/200483 proposed an objective system of tables and scores in which the injuries arising 
from a car accident were assigned an specific rating according to their seriousness84. This 
punctuation was translated into an economic compensation by a later table, which modified the 
pecuniary redress depending on the age of the victim85. Nevertheless, this system was severely 
criticized, as it failed to provide with an adequate compensation which could foresee the future 
medical expenditures and factual needs arising from the harm. Law 35/2015 86  made a 
praiseworthy attempt in order to modify this unfair situation, that did not have in mind all the 
expenses and/or loss of profit that could be derived from the injury itself, not just to the victim 
suffering from it, but also to the people which are left in charge to safeguard his interests: it 
incremented, on average, a 35% of the monetary compensation which would have been granted 
under the previous evaluation system, and furthermore, introduced a wide range of provisions 
that allowed to claim not only the present harm at the time of the consideration of the case, but 
also the possible future needs deriving from those sequels. Certainly, this law opened the door 
for many victims, that from 2016 on, could actually claim harms, injuries and argue necessities 





80 Royal Legislative Decree 339/1990 of the 2nd March, passing the consolidated version of the Law on Traffic, 
Circulation of Motor Vehicles and Road Safety, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdlg/1990/03/02/339/con . Not in 
force, although subsection 3 of art. 1 of Royal Decree 1507/2008 adopts the concepts contained in Annex I of the 
text.  
81 M. A. de Dios, “Some questions on Civil Responsibility of the Vehicle: the concept of Accident or Traffic Event 
and Motor Vehicle as the Main Elements of th System”, Universidad de Salamanca. 
82 Of Compulsory Civil Responsiblity Insurance in the Circulation of Motor Vehicles, ibid 79.  
83 Royal Legislative Decree 8/2004 of the 29th October, passing the consolidated text of the Law on Civil 
Responsibility and Insurance in the Circulation of Motor Vehicles, ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rdlg/2004/10/29/8/con  
84 Table 2.A.1 or Medical Table, ibid 86. 
85 Table 2.A.2 or Economic Table, ibid 86. 
86 Law 35/2015 of the 22nd September, reforming the method for evaluating personal damages caused in traffic 
accidents, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2015/09/22/35  
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1.2.1. Potential Claim for Damages under Law 35/2015. 
As the wording of the case indicates that the accident happened “several years ago”, it is 
reasonable to state that, if this period did not exceed 5 years, Law 35/2015 could be applicable. 
According to the system which was explained above, the possible claim for damages that the 
perpetrator could be facing is the following:  
 
- In concept of anatomic-functional aftermaths of table 2.A.1, the injury of tetraplegia from C5 to C6 
(01003), bearing in mind that Rose can feel the arms, but not move them87. The punctuation which is 
given to this injury goes from 96 to 98 points, and in light of table 2.A.2 and Rose’s age, the 
corresponding compensation would fall in between 340.000 and 367.000 euros (ages from 1 to 25 years). 
- In regards to personal particular damages included in table 2.B:  
o The particular damage of section 3, referring to the lose of quality of life derived from the 
physical aftermaths, and being unquestionably qualified as serious or very serious. The 
compensation will vary from 40.000 to 150.000 euros 
o The particular damage of section 4, regarding the lose of quality of life of relatives of the badly 
injured, from 30.000 to 145.000 euros. 
o The particular damage of art. 105, referring to moral aftermaths, up to 97.000 euros. 
o The restitution of any expenditure incurred in as a consequence of the injuries, including 
sanitary assistance or surgical procedures. 
- As for the emerging harm 88  which could be appreciated, the following circumstances should be 
mentioned: 
o In light of table 2.C.1, up to 12.000 euros a year in concept of future medical assistance. 
Nonetheless, this compensation will not be perceived by Rose, but by the competent public 
health service in accordance with the law and the possible applicable covenants in the matter89. 
o Up to 9.500 euros a year for the necessary rehabilitation in cases of tetraplegia90. 
o Deriving from the indisputable lose of personal autonomy:  
 Up to 150.000 to adequate the house, in virtue of art. 118.1. 
 The need of a third person’s assistance: according to table 2.C.2 and art. 123, the hours 
which should be compensated for people suffering from the tetraplegia of code 01003 
go from 11 to 12 hours. Table 2.C.3 imposses a pecuniary compensation which will 
fall in between and 620.000 and 800.000 euros, depending on Rose’s age at the time 
of the accident (estimated from 13 to 25 years, as to be of legal age nowadays). 
 
Hence, the result of a simple numerical calculation determines that the civil responsibility that 
the offender could be facing, and that Rose should receive as a consequence of her injuries, 
will go from circa 1.030.000 to practically 1.800.000 euros, without counting the maximum of 
12.000 euros a year which will be transferred to the competent health service in concept of 
future medical assistance nor the costs that could have arose from the sanitary or surgical 
assistance which was needed to keep Rose alive. This amount can be partially or fully 
substituted, either by request of the parties to the judge or through mediation91, for a life 
annuity92. To conclude, it is necessary to indicate that, if the previous score and table system 





87 Despite having the damage in C7, and bearing in mind the degenerative condition of the ailment. 
88 Table 2.C., ibid 86.  
89 Art 114, ibid 86. 
90 Art. 116.4, ibid 86. 
91 Following the mediation procedures established by Law 5/2012 of the 6th July, of Mediation in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2012/07/06/5  
92 Art. 41, ibid 86. 
93 The old top for the injury of tetraplegia, according to the age which was used for calculation purposes, would 
be 340.000 euros, the exact amount allocated to the new minimum threshold.  
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1.3. Jurisdiction to hear from the case.  
The Law of Criminal Procedure 94  contemplates the birth of both criminal and civil 
responsibility as a consequence of a single unlawful conduct: art. 100 CrimPL states that “a 
penal action arises from every offence or misdemeanour, and a civil action can also arise to 
restore the object, repair the harm or compensate the damages caused by the punished 
behavior”. Such actions, civil and criminal, “may be exercised jointly or separately”, although 
the initiation of a separate civil procedure will not be possible until the criminal action has been 
ascertained through a definitive judgement. To exercise the civil action on a separate procedure, 
the claimant “must give up or expressly put apart such action as to be able to exercise it once 
the criminal trial is over95”. The reader might be already tempted to assure that, in accordance 
with the legal frame settled above, it is for the Investigative Courts and, at a later stage, for the 
Penal Courts, to hear from both actions.  
 
Even so, reality turns out to be more difficult than that: article 115 of CrimPL states, in a similar 
manner to article 130(1) of the Penal Code, that “penal responsibility ends with the decease of 
the offender”. That is not to say that the offence does not exist anymore, but for mere 
pragmatical reasons, the subsequent punishment won’t be imposed, following the criminal 
personality principle. As diligences cannot be open in regards to a person which is already  
dead96, the criminal way is completely inefficient for the case being analysed.  
 
Nevertheless, the same art. 115 of CrimPL later recites that “(…) the civil action subsits 
towards his heirs and successors, being exclusively exercisable before the civil jurisdiction and 
in the civil way”. In light of articles 4597 and 52(9)98 of the Law of Civil Procedure99, it must 
be stated that the competent Court to hear the case will be the First Instance Court of the judicial 
district in which the accident took place. The subsequent civil action will not be addressed to 
the perpetrator of the negligence, but to his heirs100, that despite not mediating in the production 
of the result, may agree to the ill-fated heritage left by the actor101 when accepting his legacy. 
Even if repudiating the succession (both rights and duties) in virtue of art. 1008 of the Civil 
Code, or simply not manifesting on the matter, art. 1005 of the same text would vest Clare with 
the possibility of “(…) asking the Notary Public to communicate the heirs a term of 30 clear 
days to either accept the legacy expressly or, in the case they do not manifest their will, accept 
it presumptively”, finding new subsidiary heirs and successors or forcing the actual ones to 
make a decision. If those wouldn’t be known or would refuse to appear in the civil proceedings, 
the process would still go on, declaring the defendant “in absentia” in accordance with art. 16 




94  Royal Decree of the 14th September 1882, by which the Criminal Procedure Law is approved, ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rd/1882/09/14/(1)/con  
95 Article 112, ibid 94. 
96 And if they would be open, art. 637.3, ibid 94, would force the judge to immediately dismiss proceedings.  
97 “it is for the Courts of First Instance to hear (…)  all the civil matters that, by express legal provision, are not 
attributed to other courts”,ibid 99.  
98 “whenever a compensation for the damages arising from a traffic accident is being claimed, the competent 
court will be that of where the events took place”, ibid 99. 
99 Law 1/2000 of the 7th January, of Civil Procedure, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2000/01/07/1/con  
100 In accordance with his will or the applicable norms of the Civil Code (arts. 913, 915 ff). 
101 Judgement 230/2014 of the 7th May, Supreme Court of Spain, ECLI: ES:TS:2014:1769. 
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1.4. Punishment.  
Being the potential claim for damages already explained in part 1.2.1. of this dissertation, the 
present section will exclusively analyse the criminal punishment which would be applicable to 
the commission of the conduct and the perpetration of the results described in the case study.  
 
Thus, Rose’s injuries must be punished as serious, negligent injuries under art. 152(1)(2º) of 
the Penal Code, with a sentence of imprisonment from one to three years, together with the 
deprivation from the use of motor vehicles and mopeds for a term of one to four years, as 
consequence of the circumstances of art. 379.  
 
The author considers that if Clare’s woundings would ever get to be appreciated, they would 
be punished under art. 152(1)(1º), as being the outcome of a negligent result linked to the type 
referred to in art. 147(1). In such case, the norms of art. 77 of the Penal Code would have a role 
to play in the determination of the punishment: “(…) in the event that a single act constitutes 
two or more offences, (…) the punishment will be allocated in the superior half of the most 
serious infraction”. The link of the harmful results with the negligent conduct is out of 
question, specially if realising that both of them are of the same nature. As a result, the 
concurrence of offences will derive in the sentence of imprisonment from two years and one 
day to three years, with the application of the deprivation from the use of motor vehicles and 
mopeds for a term of two years, six months and one day to four years, as the circumstances of 
art. 379 are present in both cases.  
 
Furthermore, the Judge deciding the case would have to “impose, according to the seriousness 
of the offence, at least one of the following:  
 
- Decommissioning or disqualification from public service or office.  
- Special disqualification for the exercise of passive suffrage. 
- Special disqualification for the exercise of an office, public charge, profession, craft, industry, trade, 
exercise of parental responsibility, guardianship, fostering, care or any other right, deprivation of the 
parental responsibility, if any of those would have had a link with the offence, which must be expressly 
established within the Judgement102”.  
 
The duration of such accessory penalties will last from 1 to 10 years after the moment in which 
the imprisonment sentence is fulfilled according to the severe consideration of the imprudence. 
In virtue of  art. 57(1) of the Spanish Penal Code, the Judge could also determine some of the 
measures of art. 48. Nonetheless, the negligent character of the analysed conduct makes it 
difficult to justify the enforcement of such procedures, as there is no real intention to harm the 
victim, and therefore, their imposition would constitute an unproportionate and inappropriate 
limitation of the rights of the reckless autor with no legal effective substantiation on the 
protection of the victim. 
 
2. Analysis of the possibility of allocating responsibility on a subject which is dead before 
the start of the necessary diligences, and consequently, hold him accountable “post 
mortem” for the committed behaviors. How, in which cases and which types of 
responsibility can be transferred to others? 
 
 
102 Article 56 PC. 
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As already foreseen by the grounds used to argument the two previous sections of Question 1 
of the case study, none of the responsibilities, criminal or civil, can be allocated to a subject, 
which is considered to be dead under the requirements of Annex 1 of Royal Decree 
1723/2012103. When stating “the latter died outright”, the own wording of the case study 
excludes the appreciation of any of those. Withal, it is necessary to make some observations, 
even if only addressed to further concretise what was already exposed. 
 
Art. 115 CrimPL embraces the extinction of civil personality of art. 32 CC, already providing 
for subsidiary responsibility allocated in the heirs of the perpetrator. The successors of this 
“peculiar type” of inheritance will be determined, if possible, according to the offender’s own 
will. If facing an “abintestato” situation, the general norms regarding succession and legacy 
(arts. 913, 915 ff.) contained in the Civil Code will determine who the subsidiary responsible 
is. In both cases, the current legal framework relies on a vast and well thought range of actions, 
procedures and rights which allow the victim, in this case, Rose, to enforce the civil liability 
against the appropriate successor. The quality of this legal machinery was already enshrined 
by the High Court of Spain in, among others, Judgement 360/2013104, of certain resemblance 
to the facts being examined. In addition, it is important to note down that art. 117 PC refers to 
the subsidiary responsibility which is due by certain insurance companies to their policyholders 
when facing civil responsibility. This duty to respond in behalf of its clients will go up until 
the limit which is established in the policy or, in the absence of such, to the legal standard 
settled down by art. 4 subsection 2 of the RDL 8/2004105, adapting those amounts to the 
European requirements106. This would open a brand new door: the option of the car insurance 
having to respond in behalf of the offender. To start, the insurance company must cope with 
all the arising civil responsibility of any traffic incidence which is encompassed by the already 
known concept of circulation, unless the policy states the opposite. However, this initial 
payment which would have to be made by the insurer to Rose will fall within the scope of art. 
10 subsection a) of the same text, recognising the company’s “right of recourse”, in virtue of 
which, “driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, toxic drugs, narcotics or 
psychotropic substances”, it would be able to claim the upfront payment to the legal heirs of 
the perpetrator, under the exact same grounds which were explained in regards to inheritance 
and subsidiary transmission of responsibility.  
 
The situation becomes even harder, if possible, when bringing to the table the idea of allocating 
penal responsibility to a deceased. Arts. 100 and 115 CrimPL, together with art. 130(1º) PC 
ostrasize such possibility at its mere consideration. However, it is of remarkable interest to 
legally wonder about the “raison d´être” underneath the existence of such precepts. Guilt, 
prosecution, indictment, they all are phases of the procedural stage of any criminal trial or 
investigation, which depend on a very fine line that ties the punished behavior, the unlawful 
result and the humane actor: the causal link. The identification of the perpetrator and later 
objective demonstration of the commission of the behaviour which is being imputed is the 
traditional and theoretical presumption which is needed to allocate criminal responsibility. This 
 
103 Royal Decree 1723/2012 of the 28th December, by which activities of collection, clinic use and territorial 
coordination of the human organs intended for transplants are regulated, establishing quality and security 
requisites, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/1979/10/27/30/con  
104 Judgement 360/2013 of the 1st April, Supreme Court of Spain, ECLI:ES:TS:2013:2252, also dealing with very 
serious, negligent bodily harm of art. 152.1 PC and the subsidiary responsiblity of certain subjects and entities, in 
this case, the Administration for the Execution of Criminal Sanctions (Prison Administration). 
105 Ibid 83.  
106 And more specifically, to the exigencies of Council Directive 84/5/CEE of the 30th December 1984, on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use 
of motor vehicles, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1984/5/oj  
The Legal Transcendence of Personal-Life Ending Decisions 
 - 28 - 
 
principle, academically known as “penal personality” or “personal responsibility107”, upholds 
the legality principle and introduces the legal certainty which is needed in a field such as 
criminal law, bearing in mind the “exceptional court” tradition and lack of judicial 
independence which was inherent in the pre-democratic Spain. Admitting the transmission of 
penal responsibility to a subject which is “alien” to both the behavior and the result would go 
against the very grounds of this principle, making all the foundations of our current criminal 
regulation shake and most likely break. 
 
 
3. Describe in criminal law terms the help Rose is asking for, bearing in mind her 
personal circumstances, and determine the resulting punishment that may be imposed 
once the perpetrator is known. What would happen if the author is found 20 years 
after the case is closed? 
 
Wondering about the possibility of offering the necessary aid and support that is needed by 
someone who cannot factually provoke his own death is wondering about assisted suicide. 
Assisted suicide is acknowledged by the Penal Code in its article 143, and actually establishes 
a significant difference in its punishment depending on the kind of help which is offered. 
Admittedly, this provision makes an exhaustive description of 3 different cooperative conducts 
in its sections 1, 2 and 3, which can be later modified by the circumstances settled in section 4. 
This last section embodies what has been academically considered as euthanasia, proving that, 
far from being a mere conduct related to death, it has more to do with the concurrence of very 
specific circumstances in both the suffering patient, the killing behavior and its executor108. 
These auxiliary conducts are described by the article in the following terms:  
 
1. “Whoever induces another to commit suicide will be sentenced to imprisonment from four to eight 
years.  
2. Imprisonment from two to five years shall be imposed to whoever cooperates through necessary 
means to the suicide of another. 
3. Imprisonment from six to ten years shall be imposed if such cooperation would arrive to the 
execution of death itself.” 
 
Without limiting the foregoing, section 1 of the article will have no pragmatical relevance for 
the purposes of this study, as the wording of section 4 excludes the application of its attenuating 
effects whenever such aid is merely psychological. On the other hand, the examination of 
sections 2 and 3 turns essential before proceeding to the explanation of the circumstances 
included in section 4.  
 
Under section 2, often named “necessary cooperation to suicide”, the described behavior 
includes any support which is asked for and objectively required for the commission of suicide, 
regardless this conduct implies an active, direct action on the victim or not. One of the best 
illustrators of this category would be the prescription, collection or facilitation of certain drugs 
or substances allowing the person to reach his aims. Therefore, the action in question should 
not directly lead to the causation of death, but undoubtedly free the way, and, as jurisprudence 
 
107  A. C. Riezu, “The Constitutional Principle of Personal Responsibility for One’s Action. Quantitative 
Manifestations”, ACPCP, Vol. LXII, 2009,  p. 214/215. Available in: 
https://www.boe.es/publicaciones/anuarios_derecho/abrir_pdf.php?id=ANU-P-2009-
10021100252_ANUARIO_DE_DERECHO  
108 M. M. Gómez, J. L. A. Tejuca, “Judicial Consideration of the Problem of Euthanasia”, La Ley Gazette, Vol. 
3, 1992, p. 861 ff. Available in: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=73944  
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requires, “enable and determine the production of the suicide (…) as without that support, the 
suicide would not have happened”. 
 
Section 3, academically known as “executive cooperation to suicide” or “homicide-suicide”, 
encompasses the causation of someone’s death at his request by a conduct which implies, up 
to some extent, the execution of a direct, active and determined act objectively prone to cause 
the decease of the requester. The only difference which can be appreciated in such case with a 
pure homicide is the desire and consent of the person being killed. Accordingly, this precept is 
used for the punishment of those conducts that do not comply with the requirements of section 
4, as it will be explained later on. Nevertheless, it is important to note down that the difference 
for punishing an offence under section 3 or section 4 is not material, it does not lie in the 
behavior itself, but merely circumstantial 109 : it depends on the appreciation of a set of 
requirements that, in certain cases, have a considerable room for interpretation. Judgement 
47/2002110 points out this difference when assessing the validity of the consent which was 
given by the requester. That being said, section 4 of article 143 of the Penal Code reads as 
follows: 
 
“Whoever causes or actively cooperates with necessary and direct behaviors to the death of a person suffering a 
severe, chronic and disabling ailment that would undoubtedly cause his death or a serious, irreversible condition 
causing constant and unbearable physical or psychological pain, by express, genuine and unequivocal consent of 
the latter, will be punished with a sentence one or two degrees under the punishments contemplated by sections 2 
and 3 of the present article”. 
 
In accordance with the wording of the section, the attenuating effect which is inherent to its 
application will only be deployed if:  
 
- There is unequivocal and express authorisation of the patient to cause his death. Apart 
from the consideration that derives from the express character of the consent, it must 
be expressed in a conscious and reflective way, hardening the path for those who, 
because of their condition or development, are not legally authorized to give valid 
consent under the requirements of the Civil Code111, and more specifically, the General 
Law of Health112 and the Basic Regulatory Law of the Autonomy of the Patient113, 
which refer to the consent which can be granted over someone’s own life and body. In 
this context, doctrine wonders whether “living wills” or “advanced directive 
documents” of Law 41/2002 can authorise euthanasic conducts and serve as valid 
consent for the purpose of this section. Generally speaking, it is held that if such 
documents are to be taken into account, the person granting the authorisation should 
always have the control of such consent until the very last moment, ostracizing the 
possibility of giving instructions for cases in which the grantor is deprived of 
consciousness.  
- The patient suffers permanent and unbearable ailments which either anticipate death 
or significantly deteriorate his quality of life. The present requirement is strongly 
 
109 M. D. y García Conlledo, S. B. Burusco, “Participation in Suicide and Euthanasia, an outline of its penal 
consideration in Spain”, RNFP, Vol. 8, nº 79, 2012, p. 127. Available in: 
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=4136981  
110 Judgement 47/2002 of the 2nd February, Provincial Court of Almería, regarding the executive help given by 
the accused to an immigrant who requested his death due to the harshness of his personal situation.  
111 Arts. 199 ff.  
112 Law 14/1986, General of Health, ibid 15. 
113 Law 41/2002, Basic Regulatory of the Autonomy of the Patient and Rights and Duties in regards to Information 
and Clinical Documentation, ibid 13.  
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influenced by the development of human sciences, that have proven to be able to find 
treatments for mostly any possible illness that may be suffered. There is no objective 
requirement which forces the victim to run out of all the available scientific remedies 
in order to appreciate section 4. Nevertheless, the illness in question must have enough 
entity to either provoke an unbearable state of pain, to which there is no possible 
amelioration, or directly anticipate the moment of death. In both cases, the quality of 
life of the sufferer must be significantly diminished due to those sufferings. Thus, the 
severe affectation of the quality of life of the victim, in one way or the other, does 
constitute a requisite to appreciate this section, as enshrined by Judgement 85/2016114, 
considering the section inapplicable due to the lack of seriousness and objective 
availability of a simple treatment for the illness of the requester.  
- The executor cooperates with the necessary behaviors of section 2 or directly causes 
death under the requisites of section 3. The exclusive application to those sections 
responds to a pure pragmatical reason: whenever euthanasia is appreciated, it must be 
referred to a factual, human and physical impossibility to commit suicide, not just the 
fear or reticence to proceed to the killing once the decision has been taken. When 
considering such elements, dying with dignity should always refer to the peace and 
calmness that the method chosen by the patient provides him in the moment of death, 
and despite the available means may undoubtedly influence the requester, fear should 
never be the basis in which the patient motivates his request to die or his reasons to 
live. 
 
Deciding on matters that have such a stong indisputable bond with death makes the debate of 
the self disponibility of life arise. The first thing that must be mentioned here is that the 
maximum act of self disposition of life, suicide, or better said, attempting suicide, is not 
punished under Spanish criminal law115. The Constitutional Court has reiterated in several 
judgements that the lack of criminal comdemn to suicide refers to reasons of pure criminal 
policy, being held as a manifestation of the rights to individual freedom and free development 
of the personality, more than the expression of the self disposition of the right to life itself. 
Most academic opinions move into that direction: professor Zugaldia Espinar states that 
“freedom itself depends on a series of logical prius (…), without life, there is no freedom, and 
freedom, without fairness and justice, would be pure utopia”, upholding the argumentation 
which was set in stone by the Constitutional Court in its Judgement 53/1985116: “life must be 
considered as a substratum for the rest of the rights, as a noun that the latter qualify”. 
Nonetheless, those ideas should not be regarded as an absolute negative to ponder euthanasia. 
When referring to the superior values of the Spanish legal system, art. 1.1 of the Constitution 
somehow forgets to mention life among freedom, justice, fairness and political pluralism. The 
existence of not only Judgement 53/1985, but also the opinions under the scope of Professor 
Zugaldia’s simply reminds all the legal operators that, despite not being consecrated as a 
supreme value, this constitutional consideration is not expressly needed: ultimately, the 
predetermined legal framework settled by the Constitution is a human invention which is 
superposed to the mere existence of the human being and, therefore, the prevalence of life does 
not have to be further declared117. As a matter of fact, the impunity of suicide already enshrines 
 
114 Judgement 578/2016 of the 19th April, Provincial Court of Zaragoza, ECLI:ES:APZ:2016:578. 
115 Even if it would be, suicide itself could never be punished, as criminal responsibility disappears with the death 
of the presumed offender in the terms explained before. Whenever talking about punishing suicide, it must be 
understood that such penalty falls over the attempt of committing suicide.  
116 Judgement 53/1985 of the 11th April, Constitutional Court of Spain, ECLI:ES:TS:1985:53. 
117 M. M. Gómez, J. L. A. Tejuca, “Judicial Consideration of the Problem of Euthanasia”, La Ley Gazette, Vol. 
3, 1992, p. 861 ff.  
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a certain balancing of the right to life and the respect which is due to human dignity (Zugaldia 
Espinar), and therefore, it is impossible to ascertain anything else but the mere prevalence of 
life, as no right should be considered to have an unlimited application118. The regulation of the 
state of necessity119, self-defence120, or the legitimate exercise of a right, charge or position121 
on criminal terms reinforces the limited character of the right to life, even if less-limited than 
some others. Accordingly, whenever the sacrality of life and the principle of quality of life 
collide, two questions should be answered.  
 
- Is the right to life an absolute value? 
- Is life an available right? 
 
The consideration of both of those questions has undoubtedly determined the current 
configuration and pragmatical consequences of section 4 of art. 143 PC: the attenuation which 
is granted by it is the result of understanding that quality of life is a factor to be taken into 
account when facing an euthanasic situation. The seriousness of the disease suffered by the 
requester will majorly determine this consideration, although other factors, such as the 
humanitarian reasons of the physical perpetrator or the consent which is given will shape the 
final legal outcome.  
 
As Rose cannot move, all the conducts related to any help to die will be classified under the 
basic definition of art. 143(3) PC, executive cooperation to suicide. Although it is not indicated 
if the degenerative condition she has will anticipate her death, the seriousness of such ailment 
is completely out of question: she has not only seen her personal independence completely 
reduced due to the impossibility of moving, but also suffers pain due to a condition which 
exceeds irreversibility, bearing in mind its worsening character. It is logical to think that, under 
such circumstances, no Judge would dare to question the seriousness of the situation. 
Additionally, her express, valid and unequivocal consent should be considered in light of her 
age and her capacity to act 122. For all that, any person helping Rose to die will be guilty of an 
offence under art. 143(4), and depending on the reduction of the punishment which is applied, 
will be facing a sentence of imprisonment: 
 
- From 3 years to 6 years – 1 day, if the punishment is only reduced in one degree. 
- From 1 year, 6 months to 3 years – 1 day, if it is reduced in two degrees.  
 
In both cases, the Judge will have to apply at least one of the accessory penalties of art. 56 PC., 
and according to analogous cases 123 , it is really likely that such penalty will be further 
concretised in the special disqualification for the exercise of passive suffrage.  
 
Regarding the last issue posed  by question 3, the rules for the prescription of criminal offences 
must be contemplated. But firstly, it is essential to indicate that, in virtue of art. 130(6º) PC, 
the prescription of the offence determines the extinction of criminal responsibility, and 
therefore, when a specific period of time has elapsed, no one shall be hold accountable for such 
crime. This is due to the impossibility of fulfilling the objectives of general and special 
prevention which justify the imposition of punishments themselves. Keeping this in mind, art. 
 
118 Judgement 11/1981 of the 8th April, Constitutional Court of Spain, ECLI:ES:TC:1981:11. 
119 Art. 8.11 PC. 
120 Which authorises to threaten someone’s life whenever other values are at stake, art. 8.4 of the PC. 
121 Art. 8.7 PC. 
122 According to the case study, she is of legal age and is able to stand for herself in the judicial processes she 
started.  
123 Ibid 114.  
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131(1) PC states that, if the sentence of imprisonment is under ten years, the offence shall 
prescribe after ten years. If not exceeding five years, it shall prescribe after 5 years have gone 
by. The line to start counting shall be allocated to the moment in which the offence was 
committed124. For that reason, it is irrelevant to wonder if the punishment would have been 
reduced by one or two degrees: after 20 years, the person helping Rose to die would not be able 
to be prosecuted for such aid.  
 
4. Analyse the appropriateness of the way chosen by Rose to enforce her claims: the 
ordinary judicial process for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Which is the constitutional and legal substantiation for the existence of such 
procedure? List the different types of processes regarding its nature and identify its 
distinctive characteristics. Does Rose’s judicial “journey” fulfil the standards of 
preferential and summary treatment that define this procedure? 
 
The ordinary process for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms is, to be clear, a 
special process within the ordinary jurisdiction. Article 53 of the Spanish Constitution has a 
clear objective: providing the rights and freedoms granted therein with an integral protection 
and effective enforcement. Although the traditional enlightened conception of fundamental 
rights required the lack of intervention of the State, most of the constitutions enacted post-
WWII understood that the statewide protection of such grants was necessary in order to assure 
their pragmatical functioning. Not much later, the scale would tip to the other side, making 
most of academics, including Pérez Serrano, assure that “the value of any right is directly 
determined by the value of its protection”. For that reason, section 2 of the document projects 
a constitutional mandate that ensures the imposition of a dualist system: on one hand, the 
establishment of the amparo appeal before the Constitutional Court, but on the other, the 
creation of a “procedure based on the principles of preferential and summary treatment before 
the ordinary Courts”.  Both of the systems are addressed to protect the rights contained in arts. 
14, 30 and those encompassed in Chapter II of Title I (arts. 15-29) of the Constitution, although 
they do so in very different ways. 
 
This constitutional duty was soon harvested by the legislator, which decided to regulate it in 
Law 62/1978, of Jurisdictional Protection of Fundamental Human Rights125, specifying three 
separate procedures according to the fundamental right being protected and the jurisdiction 
which was assigned to hear from them: the civil, the penal and the administrative procedures. 
The rights and the scope of protection were further concretised in RLD 342/1979126 and the 2º 
Transitory Disposition of OL 2/1979127, of the Constitutional Court. However, an excessive 
strive for specification led to the dismemberment of the unitary corpus of Law 62/1978 from 
1998 on, a process that would culminate around 2002. Since that moment on, the above-
mentioned law was completely removed from the legal system.  
 
The procedures regulated therein, even if now dispersed throughout multiple bodies of 
legislation, are constitutionally required to be guided by the “principles of preferential and 
 
124 Article 132.2 PC. 
125  Law 62/1978 of the 26th December, of Jurisdictional Protection of Fundamental Human Rights, ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/1978/12/26/62  
126 Royal Legislative Decree 342/1979 of the 20th February, on the enlargement of the scope of Law 62/1978, ibid 
128, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/rd/1979/02/20/342  
127  Organic Law 2/1979 of the 3rd October, of the Constitutional Court, ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/1979/10/03/2/con  
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summary treatment”. The Constitutional Court gives a definition of such concepts in its 
Judgement 81/1992128: “preference implies the absolute priority in regards to the norms that 
regulate the functional competence and arrangement of the workload; summary character is 
tantamount, as stated by doctrine, to its vulgar acceptation of quickness”. This legal taxation 
is translated in the short terms which are settled by the different competent laws and precepts 
to solve the abbreviated procedures which arise from the interposition of any procedure of this 
nature. These consolidated provisions are the following:  
- In regards to the protection before the civil jurisdiction, art. 249(2º) of Law 1/2000129 
including the rights to honour, intimacy, personal portrayal or any other asking for civil 
coverage.  
- Penal protection of fundamental rights was redesigned by Law 38/2002130 as to fit into 
the scope of criminal abbreviated procedures. Any offence which affects a fundamental 
right might be subsumed to this type, including, among others, intimacy, personal 
portrayal, inviolability of homes, slander and defamation. 
- Law 36/2011131 created a new specific procedure which was not contemplated in the 
original 1978’s scheme: the social/labour procedure. In virtue of arts. 177-184 of the 
text, matters on trade-union freedom, strike or others related to the labour relationship 
might be dealt with under the present.  
- Quite surprisingly, OL 2/1989132 establishes, in its article 453, a proceeding by which 
“disciplinary actions affecting the exercise of a fundamental right might be challenged 
(…) within a summary and preferential appeal”. 
- Last, but not least, arts. 114 to 122 of the Law 29/1998133 embody the consolidated 
version of the old administrative appeal provided by Law 62/1978134. As this was the 
way chosen by Rose to enforce her claims, it will be further analysed continuedly.  
 
Before proceeding to the such analysis, it is considered necessary to indicate that the above 
mentioned dispersion does not merely end there. Some rights are protected under their own 
regulatory laws, such as in the case of judicial dissolution and suspension of political parties, 
right of rectification or habeas corpus procedures. This further fragmentation has led a 
considerable part of the academic world to support a future reunification of all the provisions 
in a single legislative body, adopting a similar structure to that prior to 2002.  
 
4.1. Administrative Protection of Fundamental Rights under Law 29/1998, Regulatory of 
the Administrative Jurisdiction. 
For the sake of determining whether the use of this procedure is adequate to the means Rose 
intended, article 114, enumerating the material objects of this special procedure, must be read 
side by side with article 31(2) of this legaltext. According to the latter, people can turn to the 
Administrative Jurisdiction whenever “they intend the judicial acknowledgement of a 
juridically individualised situation, or the adoption of the appropriate measures to reestablish 
 
128 Judgement 81/1992 of the 28th May, Constitutional Court of Spain, ECLI:ES:TC:1992:81. 
129 Law 1/2000 of the 7th January, of Criminal Procedure. ELI: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-
2000-323#a249  
130 Law 38/2002 of the 24th October, of partial reform of the Law of Criminal Procedure, regarding the quick and 
immediate indictment of certain offences and misdemeanours, and the modification of abbreviated procedures, 
ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2002/10/24/38  
131  Law 36/2011 of the 10th October, regulatory of the Social Jurisdiction, ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2011/10/10/36/con  
132 Organic Law 2/1989 of the 13th April, of Militar Procedure, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/1989/04/13/2  
133  Law 29/1998 of the 13th July, regulatory of the Administrative Jurisdiction, ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/1998/07/13/29/con  
134 Ibid 125. 
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it”. It is not explicit whether Rose starts the procedure as a consequence of a previous 
administrative act, but whatever the case may be, art. 114 section 2 allows her to lodge the 
claim regardless the existence of that previous document. In such case, the author considers 
she would argue that the ignorance of her individual situation, together with the inexistence of 
a solid legal framework in the matter, constitutes a violation of the articles mentioned in the 
wording of the case study135, and as a consequence, she will be able to effectively enforce her 
claim before the Administrative Courts.  
 
In relation to these issues, the author would like to point out that the exact same procedure, 
differences aside, was used by Debbie Purdy in the United Kingdom. Thus, Purdy sought a 
statement from the Crown Prosecution Service deciding whether they would accuse her 
husband if he would help her to reach assisted dying in Switzerland. The Office found itself 
unable to respond to such a question, given the inconsistency and fuzziness with which the 
topic was regulated. On its side, the House of Lords recognised this situation136, estimated the 
cause and encouraged the Prosecution Service to enact the Policy for Prosecutors in Respect 
of Cases of Encouraging or Assisted Suicide137, which indicated a set of circumstances that 
would be taken into account whenever to decide (or desist) from prosecuting such offences.  
 
Taking into account these consideration, the author estimates Rose’s claim would most likely 
seek such a statement from the Public Authorities. Nonetheless, her pretensions are 
desestimated due to the criminal regulation in force of assisted suicide and euthanasia. 
Regarding the formal characteristics of the first instance protection process itself, arts. 115 ff. 
of Law 29/1998 establish a very specific temporary terms to which the deciding court must 
abide. As no further information is provided regarding the duration of the procedures, it is 
impossible to analyse whether the first Court complied with those timelines or not. Without 
precluding the exposed, it is indeed possible to analyse the extension of the integrity of the 
processes. Nothing can be said in regards to the grounds invoked for the desestimation of the 
cause by the Administrative Court, the High Court of Galicia and the Supreme Court of Spain, 
as the Constitutional Court, that would most likely have a saying in regards to the potential 
violation of such rights, never took a stand: the defeat of the procedural succession after Rose’s 
death prevented the Court from further analysing the circumstances. Withal, the whole judicial 
process was long enough to be heard by three different instances, another jurisdiction and even 
allow Rose to find her way to a graceful death. No matter how short each procedure was, the 
succession of events described in the case study requires an amount of time that certainly does 
not comply with the aims pursued by the summary and preferential principles inherent to this 
protection procedures.  
5. Clare D.L., mother of the deceased, asserts the existence of civil law precepts, apart 
from the express desire of her daughter captured in her will, which allows the first to 
represent the latter within the already-mentioned constitutional process. Is there any 
role for Rose’s will on the procedural legitimation of her mother to represent her? 
Which is the reasoning that leads to the dismissal of the procedural succession by the 
Constitutional Court?  
 
135 Articles 10 and 15 of the Spanish Constitution. 
136  R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions (2009) UKHL 45, available in: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldjudgmt/jd090730/rvpurd-1.htm  
137  Available in: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/suicide-policy-prosecutors-respect-cases-encouraging-
or-assisting-suicide  
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Question 2 of the present dissertation already dealt with some provisions that indirectly referred 
to procedural succession in the context of subsidiary civil liability. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
the succession intended by Rose’s mom exceeds the rationale explained back then. Thus, she 
does not merely intend to be recognised with a right, initially allocated upon her daughter, that 
now, being the latter deceased, she could inherit in accordance with the provisions of the Civil 
Code. Furthermore, she expects to be granted, under such grounds, with sufficient locus standi 
as to represent not only her daughter, but also her cause.  
The transmission of the totality of the rights, duties and assets being part of a person’s legacy 
is formally enshrined in art. 659 CC. But for the purpose of Question 5, the indisputable 
cornerstone provision will be art. 661 of the same legal text, stating that “heirs replace the 
deceased in all his rights and duties just for the mere fact of his death”. When proclaiming so, 
the CC is opening the door to the possibility of, arguing the death of a person meddled in a 
judicial process, constituting a de facto right upon the heirs of the claimant or defendant that 
will allow them to participate in such diligences in the place of their predecessor. Art. 16(1)  
CivPL embodies this right in what is commonly known as procedural succession mortis causa, 
giving the beneficiaries the exact same rights, standing and obligations that the original party 
held until his death. The subsequent sections of the article specify the quite simple procedure 
that must be followed to achieve this succession:  
“once the deceased has been communicated to the Court clerk by the successor, the first will arrange 
the suspension of the procedures and communicate the fact to the rest of the parties. Once the death and 
the inheritance title have been certified, the Court clerk will acknowledge the succession of the requester 
in the name of the deceased, being such fact taken into account by the Court solving the case”. 
According to what has been described above, it would be enough to simply present, firstly, the 
death certificate of the initial party of the proceedings and, more importantly for the case, the 
will that states that the requester of the procedural succession is the legitimate and appointed 
heir of the deceased. For this reason, the role of Rose’s will is more than clear: it allows her 
mom, constituted as her legitimate heir, to substitute her daughter as a party in any proceeding 
which is open right in the moment of her death just by the mere acceptance of the legacy. The 
extension of the provision to the constitutional jurisdiction should not be doubted, as art. 80 of 
OL 2/1979138, of the Constitutional Court, establishes the supplementary character of the Law 
of Civil Procedure in, inter alia,  matters of appearance to trial.  
Nonetheless, the same art. 16 CivPL will pose the core problem to the proposed succession. 
While using the expression “whenever the object of the trial is transmitted”, the Law of Civil 
Procedure admits the existence of some rights that, either because of their nature or legal 
regulation, cannot be transferred to others. In this vein, the Constitutional Court has declared 
that, due to the development that certain rights have been subject of by the legislator, their 
transferral is legally impossible and, therefore, should be regarded as of utmost personal 
character.  Constitutional Court Order 242/1998139, also referring to procedural succession in 
the context of amparo appeals, indicates that, in order to assure the possibility of transmitting 
a right, the following aspects should be taken into account: 
 
138  Organic Law 2/1979 of the 3rd October, of the Constitutional Court, ELI: 
https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/1979/10/03/2/con  
139  Constitutional Court Order 242/1998 of the 11th November, Constitutional Court of Spain, 
ECLI:ES:TC:1998:242A 
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- The legal background that must be examined is not that of succession rights, which are 
undeniable and out of question, but the specific legal regulation of the right which is 
understood to have been violated. If the configuration of the right allows its 
transmission, the following subjective requirement will be assessed.  
- The potential violation of the fundamental right in which the appeal is based must 
exceed the personal scope and project either a harm or a legitimate interest over the 
person that is willing to succeed the deceased in the proceedings. The most illustrative 
example of such circumstances lies on the appeals regarding the rights of honour, 
personal portrayal and personal and familiar intimacy140 that, due to the indisputable 
affectation that can be derived to family and relatives as a group, will be subject of 
procedural succession even before the constitutional jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 
grounds of the appeal should not be built over such actions or values that constitute, as 
enshrined by Judgements 120/1990141 and 137/1990142, “pure acts of will that only 
concern the person in question”: the potential legal successors must be able to claim 
an objective constitutional interest in the progression of the proceedings.  
The legal protection and regulation of the right to life throughout the whole legal framework 
turns it, ultimately, in the most personal right of those which are granted by the Constitution. 
Suicide and euthanasia are acts of self disposition of life that only affect the right to life of the 
person who takes such a life-ending decision. The commission of suicide (either assisted or 
not) does not raise the matters of e.g. the right to freedom, which due to its nature, is likely to 
collide with other people’s interest. Its unassailable personal character has led, without a doubt, 
to the desestimation of Clare’s procedural succession claim by the Constitutional Court, 
understanding that both the right and the derived interest are non-transferable.  
6. Identify possible European and International judicial bodies or institutions that, 
being the case already dismissed by the Spanish courts and tribunals, may hear it 
and determine the suitability of the decisions to the international standards and 
obligations binding for Spain, as well as the possible requisites for the acceptance of 
the claim. 
Spain, as a democratic state under the rule of Law, has subscribed a well-nourished list of 
international treaties and conventions143, and is part of most of the European and international 
bodies which have the promotion of Human Rights among their aims and objectives. The 
membership of such international organisations is commonly coupled with the existence of 
supervisory bodies and complaint procedures, addressed to force the commonality of  Member 
States to not merely ratify, but also enforce, uphold and protect those agreements and covenants, 
looking after the pragmatical application of their provisions. And even so, the existence of such 
procedures has not been able to eradicate, at least completely, the behaviors and practices 
which are considered to be condemned. In relation to this, we would like to mention that the 
2020/2021 Report of the Situation of Human Rights in the World elaborated by Amnesty 
 
140 Under OL 1/1982 of the 5th May, of Civil Protection of the Right to Honour, Personal and Familiar Intimacy 
and Personal Portrayal, ELI:  https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/1982/05/05/1/con  
141  Juridical Ground nº 7, Judgement 120/1997 of the 27th June, Constitutional Court of Spain, 
ECLI:ES:TC:1990:120. 
142  Juridical Ground nº5, Judgement 137/1990 of the 19th July, Constitutional Court of Spain, 
ECLI:ES:TC:1990:137 
143 With the notable exception of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Member of their Families, that was not ratified by any Western European or North American country 
considered to be a migrant-receiving State.  
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International144 brought forward some delicate topics that would undoubtedly make more than 
one blush, such as: the regulation of housing, the use of excessive force within penitentiary 
institutions145 and the rights of elderly people. All of those matters where considered to be 
endangered in Spain, within a report further characterised by the legal friction caused by the 
Covid-19 pandemic.  
Withal, the rights and grants included under these covenants have ensured the progressive 
development and further refinement of those legal systems that strive for the factual and real 
fulfilment of human rights. Within this question, the author will analyse three different 
complaint procedures that, either because of their degree of legal acceptance, their binding 
character or their regulation, have been considered suitable for the present case study. Without 
further ado, such examination may be found hereafter. 
6.1. The European Court of Human Rights. 
The European Convention of Human Rights146 provides, in its art. 34, for the existence of a 
complaint procedure “available to individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one 
of the Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto”, 
which shall be addressed to and heard by the European Court of Human Rights. Such 
proceeding, as stated before, must refer to the lack of compliance, violation or disregard made 
by any of the contracting parties of the Convention within a decision of its internal affairs that, 
due to the binding character of the agreement, shall always be interpreted in accordance with 
the provisions therein.  
Regarding the present case study, it should be mentioned that Clare could argue that, in light 
of the rights contained in the European Convention of Human Rights, and more specifically 
for this case, arts. 2 147 , 3 148  and 8 149 , the Spanish institutions did not comply with the 
obligations arising from the document when desestimating the procedural succession.    
In relation to it, it has to be mentioned that, in order to present an admissible claim before the 
ECrtHR, the following requirements must be observed:  
- The pretension will be signed by the claimant, no anonymous claim shall be accepted150. 
- She must have ran out of all the national legal ways available to solve the pretended 
violation, and no more than 6 months may have elapsed since the end of such national 
 
144 Report 2020/2021 of Amnesty International, the situation of the Human Rights in the World, 7th April 2021, 
POL 10/3202/2021, Available in:  
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1032022021ENGLISH.PDF  
145 The Report refers to “coercitive measures” that intend to reduce and immovilise inmates, even when not 
objectively needed, page 334. 
146 European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, Council of Europe, 1950, available in: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf  
147 Right to life, understanding the dying process as a human state prior to the actual moment of death. 
148 Prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, bearing in mind Rose’s state and the denial of the Spanish 
authorities to give a solution effectively improving, at least, her quality of life.  
149 Right to respect for private and family life, which has been acknowledged by the vast majority of academics 
to have been progressively enlarge as to cover “situations and circumstances that were not in the mind of its 
creators back in the 50’s”, Lord Jonathan Sumption, former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom. 
150 Art. 35(2)(a) ECHR, except in situations in which the integrity of the claimant may be at stake. That is, 
however, not case.  
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sources. This time will expire on the very last day, counting clear days, regardless such 
day is Sunday or bank holiday.  
- The pretension must not be identical to a previous one. When assessing identity, the 
Court will look at the claimant, the reported State and the alleged violation that is being 
challenged.  
- The violation must not have been assessed, considered or examined by another 
international authority151. 
- The application form which is needed to present the claim must be filled out in an 
exhaustive, careful and clear way: the mere vagueness in the description of the facts 
will lead to the inadmissibility of the pretension. 
Against this background, it is considered that even then, Clare would be facing a similar 
problem to the one described in Question 5: the Court must either acknowledge her locus standi 
to challenge a cause she is not a part of through the appreciation of a legitimate interest.  
6.2. The Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Although the idea would make the eyes of any jurist shine with excitement, we will soon send 
the thought to exile due to the lack of an European legal framework in regards to assisted dying, 
euthanasia or palliative care. The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter, CJEU) 
has been traditionally granted with 3 main complaint procedures, of which actions for omission 
could play a role in the case. In accordance with art. 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU)152 such procedure will be addressed to acknowledge an omissive 
situation provoked by the lack of action of any European institution. Such omission should 
constitute a violation of a right recognised within the European framework. Clare could try to 
argue that the absence of a minimum regulation of such issues in the European Union embodies 
a violation of some of the rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU153. 
Nevertheless, that would be forcing the EU to make a statement over a matter in which it cannot 
legislate154, and the CJEU, when being presented such a case, would directly desestimate any 
related pretension. The EU merely complements what is decided at a national scope in regards 
to Public Health, establishing cooperation between some of its members or bringing certain 
matters closer together at an European level155. However, it does not define health policies, nor 
organises the provision of health services or medical care. In consequence, the possibility of 
forcing the EU to make such a statement is not only legally unfeasible156. Thus, this  possibility 
lacks solid legal substantiation. In addition, there is no room for claiming a violation of the 
rights included in the Charter in light of the denial of the procedural succession by the 
 
151 Art. 35(2)(B) ECHR. 
152 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,  2012/C 326/01, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2012/oj  
153 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj  
154 J. L. Pridgeon, “Euthanasia Legislation in the European Union: is a Universal Law Possible?”, HanseLR, 
Vol. 2, nº 1, 2006. Available in: http://hanselawreview.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Vol2No1Art04.pdf  
155 The EU has legislated in food safety, pharmaceuticals, disease prevention or risk management, in virtue of 
the powers derived from arts. 4(k) and 6 (a) TFEU. As a matter of fact, the existence of the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention & Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) embodies the 
harmonisation strive that is intended in certain matters. 
156 The principles of attribution, proportionality and subsidiarity that bound the EU expressly impede such an 
action.  
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Constitutional Court, bearing in mind that the Charter does not have a pure binding character 
for legislation exceeding the European framework157. 
6.3. The United Nations Human Rights Committee. 
Lastly, Clare could try to assert that, with the denial of the procedural succession, the 
Constitutional Court of Spain contravened the legal obligations which are derived from the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter, ICCPR)158. Such procedure, 
heard by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (hereafter, UNHRC), is regulated in 
arts. 6 to 27 of Part III of this Covenant, and in truth, the formal character of the claim does not 
differ enormously from that of the ECrtHR. Nevertheless, some considerations must be pointed 
out:  
- Although not providing for specific terms to propose the claim, it is generally accepted 
that an abuse will be considered if the proceedings are not initiated before the time of 
5 years since the exhaustion of the national way or, if having resort to another 
international jurisdictional body, after 3 years from the resolution of the entity in 
question. 
- The claim cannot be examined if being simultaneously assessed by other international 
mechanism of revision.  
- If facing a situation in which another international mechanism desestimates the claim 
for procedural grounds, the matter shall not be deemed as examined and, therefore, it 
is still possible to seek the protection of the Committee. Furthermore, even when being 
already assessed by another legal apparatus, the claim may be considered if the 
Committee appreciates that the ICCPR offers a larger scope of protection compared to 
the previous phase. 
- The country being challenged must have expressly accepted the competence of the 
Committee under the terms laid down by the First Facultative Protocol of the ICCPR 
(1966).  
The flexible approach with which the last procedure is regulated complies the author to state 
that, if Clare would have to seek subsequent protection due to the potential desestimation of 
her cause in the international scope, the most intelligent way to proceed would be, firstly, to 
challenge the denial of the procedural succession before the  ECrtHR and, if effectively 
desestimated or not appreciated, seek protection before the UNHRC and under the ICCPR.  
7. Describe the current Spanish legal framework in regards to dignified death and 
assisted dying, analysing relevant Spanish and European jurisprudence on the matter, 
with special focus on transcendent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
The last question of the present dissertation has been formally divided as follows:  
7.1. Jurisprudential considerations on the situation prior to March 2021. 
 
157 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would have granted binding power to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, and in such circumstance, the claim might have prospered.  
158 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of the 16th 
December 1966, available in: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx  
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The legal consideration of euthanasia and assited dying prior to the enactment of OL 3/2021159 
were described in Question 3: both of those conducts, either subsumed to necessary cooperation 
of art. 143(2)PC or to executive aid of art. 143(3)PC, where punished under section 4 of the 
same article. Nonetheless, little was said in regards to the application of such provisions by the 
Spanish Courts. It is time to consider two of the cases that, without a doubt, have hasten the 
regularisation and decriminalisation of both activities in March 2021:  
 
- Ramón Sampedro (1943-1998) was a Galician sailor who saw himself bedridden after 
an accident on the beach. During the late 90’s, he was the symbol of the movement 
asking for the regulation of euthanasia, and actually allowed the whole Spanish society 
to acknowledge a situation suffered by many people that, prior to the broadcast of the 
documentary “Sampedro, dying to live160”, was merely ignored. He started judicial 
proceedings asking the legal framework to recognise the individual and extraordinary 
character of his circumstances. Throughout the diverse instances, the different judicial 
bodies only agreed to say the following: due to the criminal condemn of conducts 
related to the assistance to die, it was legally unfeasable to disregard those precepts 
and offer a particular solution to his case. Eventually, he found his way to a graceful 
death with the aid of Ramona Maneiro, his partner. She was formally accused of 
necessary cooperation to suicide, but the proceedings were dismissed due to the lack 
of objective evidences against her. Seven years later, once the offence had prescribed, 
she publicly admitted to have helped his then couple to achieve his euthanasic aims.  
 
- María José Carrasco (1958-2019)  might be an easier name to recognise due to its more 
recent character. She suffered amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, a very serious, 
degenerative and disabling disease that had shrunk her quality of live to unhuman 
levels of pain. Together with her husband, she decided to tape her death in an attempt 
to show society the pragmatical consequences of the lack of regulation of assisted 
dying procedures.  As the death was provoked by the administration of a lethal 
substance by her husband, he was accused under the terms of art. 143.3 PC. The 
handling of the case by the authorities was, to say the least, calamitous: the competent 
Provintial Court determined that, within the tape, some signs of psychological violence 
and manipulation could be observed, and therefore, asked the Courts of Violence 
against Women to investigate the cause. The case was dismissed and, during the trial, 
the Public Prosecution even stated his intention to accept a potential pardon given to 
the executor.  
 
Apart from their courage, braveness and determination, they both had something else in 
common: their clear predisposition to corner the legal framework with the most painful weapon 
they had, their merciless reality. Without them, the present thesis would end at this point and, 
in any event, would not pose the legal interest that has motivated the author to research and the 
reader to listen. 
 
7.2. OL 3/2021, regulating euthanasia.  
Without further delay, it is time to explain the inherent implications deriving from the 
enactment of OL 3/2021161 and its pragmatical consequences in relation to the previous legal 
 
159 Organic Law 3/2021 of the 24th  March, regulating euthanasia, ELI: https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/2021/03/24/3  
160  Available in: https://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/especiales-informativos/especial-informativo-sampedro-
morir-para-vivir/5516449/  
161 Ibid 159. 
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situation. The necessary point of departure will be to determine which conducts are being 
regulated, decriminalised and accepted by such legal text. But first, one essential fact must be 
pointed out: the law should not be taken as a hard break with the previous legal regime. In fact, 
it does not derogate art. 143 PC. Far from that, it retains the previous system and, additionally, 
includes a new subsection 5 within the article. It is clear that, by doing so, the legislator 
intended to give a certain degree of legal protection to those cases that, even when not 
complying with some of the requisites of the Law explained herein, are not worthy of the 
criminal comdemn of sections 2 and 3. The OL regulting euthanasia settles down the more than 
necessary legal framework in regards to two conducts: physicial-assisted dying and euthanasia. 
Such concepts and its substantial difference were already explained at the very beginning of 
the thesis. Nevertheless, the law’s exhaustive character encompasses the definition of the terms 
in its arts. 3(G)(1º) and 3(G)(2º). The guarantee of access to such procedures is proclaimed 
under art. 13, that incorporates both of the behaviors into the medical services being offered 
within the National Heathcare System, further stating its public financing. 
 
Art. 5 of the legal text contains the formal requirements that trigger the access to dying 
procedures. Its formal subdivision into sections 1 and 2 already enshrines the existence of two 
radically different situations to which the law responds differently: 
 
- Art . 5(1) refers to the generality of cases, laying down the “ordinary” requirements 
which must be complied with. Among them, it includes:  
 
o Being a Spanish national, having legal residence in Spain or, at least, being 
censed in Spain for a minimum period of twelve months, being of legal age and 
having mental capacity to act.  
o Relying on the material existence of a document that contains the medical 
process, the alternatives and factual possibilities in regards to the medical 
situation of the requester, including, among those, the existence of the different 
palliative care procedures available in Spain. 
o Having requested twice, either in written way or any other that may leave record, 
the free determination to initiate the procedure, with a minimum separation of 
fifteen days in between both of them162.  
o Suffering from a serious, untreatable condition or a chronic, disabling and 
severe ailment which may be certified by a health professional.  
o Giving informed consent before the initiation of the procedure.  
 
In this case, the request must be signed and dated by the requester in presence of a health 
professional. That being done, a deliberative process regarding the potential options of the 
patients under the current development of science will be initiated by the competent doctor, 
followed by a second consent, a second deliberative process and a cooling-off period of 24 
hours, after which the patient will decide whether to continue or desist from the procedure. 
A doctor differing from the patient’s physician will have to assess whether the formalities 
of the law are being objectively complied with until this step. If going on, the “Assessment 
and Guarantee Commission”163 will create a working group composed of a jurist and a 
health professional that, within 7 days, must submit a positive or negative report. Negative 
reports may be challenged before the administrative courts164. Positive reports will trigger 
 
162 This temporal requisite may be disregarded if a professional actually considers that the elapse of such an 
amount of time might compromise the patient’s capacity to consent, art. 5(C), second paragraph. 
163 Provided for by art. 17 and regulated in Chapter V.  
164 Art. 10(5). 
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the access to the procedure, being executed under the terms of art. 11 and, in any case, 
providing an integral support to the patient until the very moment of his death.  
 
- Art. 5(2) would be applicable whenever the patient, at an earlier stage, has provided 
for his desire of dying proceedings in advance directive documents or living wills. 
Under such circumstances, the requirements of legal capacity, consciousness and 
consent will be disregarded165. The rest of the demands are, however, still applicable. 
This constitutes a more than remarkable progress in regards to the previous situation, 
that due to the requirement of the revokability of the consent at any stage, did not even 
consider the validity of an unconscious, unaware or legally uncapable patient’s consent 
to be granted with such help.  
 
 
7.3. The European perspective: ECrtHR decisions and comparative approach. 
The plural, diverse and culturally varied character of Europe is not strange to any person aware 
of the past, present and potential future of the continent 166. Logically, this heterogeneous 
human manifestation throughout the territory has its consequences on the regulation of assited 
dying, euthanasia and palliative care in the different countries included in the physical scope 
of Europe. While some, as it is the case for Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland, regulate all 
of the above-mentioned procedures, the vast majority only tend to regulate some or one. This 
may lead the reader to think that, in the rest of the cases, countries decide to regulate palliative 
care and, accordingly, proclaim the absolute sacrality of the right to life. However, that is not 
necessarily true: countries as Albania have found in euthanasia an easy, economically 
profitable way to end up with the problems inherent to enacting a regulation that offers an 
effective help to the wide range of cases that reality is able to come up with. In this context,  
the ECrtHR must solve issues brought up by private individuals in a way that, on one hand 
respects the rights contained in the ECHR and, on the other, upholds and protects the individual 
power of each Member State to regulate such issues within their margin of appreciation. That 
being said, it is unavoidable to mention art. 8 ECHR: it constitutes the backbone of all the cases 
related to assisted dying which have been heard by the Strasbourg Court. However, the 
selection of this provision, technically referring to everyone’s “right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and correspondence” is not arbitrarily made. As foreseen before, the 
article has been subject of an extensive judicial interpretation expanding its protection to 
matters that, “prima facie”, have not much to do with such topics. Indeed, all of those matters 
had a clear, common goal back in the 50’s: the protection of individuals against the unjustified 
interferences of the Member States167. In accordance with such aim, the ECrtHR has extended 
the scope of protection to any interference that may fall within the personal, private sphere of 
individuals. Although such obligation was firstly characterised by its negative nature168, the 
Court has progressively moved towards a position in which it requires its members to guarantee 
that such unlawful interferences are not given in an “individual to individual” scheme169. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, section 2 of art. 8 ECHR actually does recognise the states with 
some margin of appreciation as to regulate private matter in a manner which is consider  
 
165 Sections b, c and e. of art. 5(1). 
166 J. L. Pridgeon, “Euthanasia Legislation in the European Union: is a Universal Law Possible?”, HanseLR, 
Vol. 2, nº 1, 2006. Available in: http://hanselawreview.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Vol2No1Art04.pdf 
167 As stated by the ECrtHR in its landmarck decisión of Libert v. France, ECHR 072 (2018). 
168 Abstaining from interfering, as stated in Barbulescu v. Romania, ECHR 742 (2017) 
169 This positive obligations was finally stated as such in Kroon and others v. The Netherlands, ECHR 35 
(1994). 
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“legitimate” under the standards of the Convention. Such ultimate right to lawfully interfere of 
the individual must be justified by: 
- Interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country.  
- Prevention of disorder or crime.  
- Protection of health, morals, or rights and freedoms of others.  
Requiring those exceptions to be not only democratically logical, but also legally provided for,  
is thought to eliminate, at least in theory, the potential, undesired arbitrary intervention of any 
Member State. That being said, the momento to analyse the landmark decisions of the 
Strasbourg Court in regards to assisted dying has arrived:  
7.3.1. Pretty v United Kingdom, (2002)170: the European Court held that the regulation of 
assisted dying in the UK and its limitations were within the scope of art. 8(2) of the 
ECHR, and therefore was not only lawful, but within the State’s margin of appreciation 
to decide whether assisted dying procedures should be regulated or not. The peculiarity 
of this case lies within the consideration of life-ending decisions: while the UK’s 
national decision stated that they did not fall within the scope of art. 8, the Strasbourg 
Court did understand that such considerations were included within the scope of the 
respect for private life and, therefore, should be protected in accordance with the 
Covenant’s provision.  
7.3.2. Haas v Switzerland, (2011)171: the Court reaffirmed the position stated in Pretty v. UK, 
assuring, once more, that life-ending decisions were unquestionably covered by the 
protection of art. 8 ECHR, and therefore, within the scope of private life. However, it 
denied the existence of any kind of purported “right to assisted suicide”, keeping in 
mind the negative nature of the obligations imposed on the States ex art. 8 and the 
margin of appreciation conferred whenever the application implies the execution of an 
active duty 
7.3.3. Koch v Germany, (2012)172: although the considerations regarding the right itself were 
very similar to the case mentioned above, the real particularity of the present case lies 
in the consideration of the locus standi of the claimant: he was the husband of the 
interested party (Mrs. Koch) and was representing her post mortem. The Court declared 
the case admissible, although dismissed Mr. Koch’s pretension.  
7.3.4. Gross v Switzerland, (2013)173: opened the door, according to Daria Sartori174, to the 
jurisprudentially substantiated application of the article to cases related to assisted 
suicide in the European scope. The Strasbourg Court did not only admitted Gross 
pretensions’ to fall within the scope of art. 8 of the ECHR: it acknowledged the 
inadequateness of a country’s regulation on assisted dying with the standards of art. 8, 
when stating that “such regulation lacked legal certainty, as leaving certain situations 
unregulated”.  
7.3.5. Lambert and others v France, (2015)175: concerning a completely unaware and  life-
sustained patient, the Court accepted the withdrawal of all kinds of life-extending 
 
170 Pretty v United Kingdom, ECHR 423 (2002). 
171 Haas v Switzerland, ECHR 2422 (2011). 
172 Koch v Germany, ECHR 1621 (2012). 
173 Gross v Switzerland, App. Nº. 67810/10 (2013). 
174 D. Sartori, “End-of-life issues and the ECHR. The value of personal autonomy within a proceduralised 
review”, QILJ, Vol. 1 (2014), available in: http://www.qil-qdi.org/end-life-issues-european-court-human-rights-
value-personal-autonomy-within-proceduralized-review/ 
175 Lambert and others v France, App. Nº. 46043/14 (2015).  
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treatments, understanding that the scientifically objetive and recommended character 
of the withdrawal did not interfere with the right to life enshrined in art. 2 of the ECHR.  
7.3.6. Nicklinson and Lamb v United Kingdom, (2015) 176 : the case was declared  
inadmissible, and accordingly, the Court did not proceed to the examination of the 
legality of the regulation of assisted dying in the UK. Nonetheless, it did enshrine its 
respect and carefulness when dealing with matters that could affect a Member State’s 
margin of appreciation.  
It is clear that, due to the disparity in the regulation of such phenomenons under the Member 
States of the Council of Europe, the ECrtHR  is quite reluctant to make any statement that could 
be identified as a potential requirement to legalise or regulate assisted dying, euthanasia and 
related procedures. Although some progressive liberal tendency can be appreciated in the 
Court’s doctrine, it is to soon to point out the direction in which the European consideration 
will move. However, it does not seem illogical to state that, as national jurisdictions approve 
and accept these dying proceedings, the Court will start to examine more in depth the 
requirements that must be appreciated from the existence of art. 8 ECHR and its inherent 




The introduction of this paragraph into the present thesis shall be considered as a requirement 
deriving from the formal nature of the analysis. With everything that has been exposed, the 
author does not intend to force the reader to think one way or the other, but quite the opposite: 
the objective of the dissertation, from its very start, has been to provide anyone, regardless 
legal professional, lay citizen or mere interested, with the necessary weapons to participate in 
one of the most exciting and polemic debates of our century, the self-disposition of life, through 
the resolution of the ethical, legal and human interrogatives which are posed by the Case Study.  
Predicting the direction in which the topic will move is unnecesary, illogical and redundant. It 
is clear that, as societies move towards new levels of acceptance, the issue arising from a now 
fiery debate will be progressively normalised. And for that very reason, the present thesis is 
made: considering the past, knowing where things come from, is the necessary requisite to 







176 Nicklinson and Lamb v United Kingdom, ECHR 23 (2015). 
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